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THE COMPETENCE OF NATIONS AND
INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW
ERIC T. LAITY*
“How is the cooperation of these vast numbers of people in
countries all over the world, which is necessary for even a modest
1
standard of living, to be brought about?”

INTRODUCTION
This article proposes a conceptual foundation for the field of
international tax law. The Article refers to this foundation as the
institutional competence of nations in global economic development.
A nation’s institutional competence may be defined as its discretion
to make decisions in pursuit of our collective goal of global economic
development, discretion that is subject to a number of standards and
limitations.
The Article analyzes the institutional competence of nations in
global economic development from the perspective of institutional
economics, simple game theory, and the literature on social norms.
The Article expresses the institutional competence of nations through
standards and limitations that reduce the abuse of sovereign
discretion and address international collective action problems in the
pursuit of global economic development. These standards and
limitations allocate prescriptive jurisdiction among nations over the
global income tax base.
The foundation proposed by the Article would coordinate
international taxation with the international regulation of trade. The
Article also addresses the proper place of capital export neutrality in
the hierarchy of values for economic development, the choice

* B.A., J.D. Harvard University. Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University School of
Law. I can be reached at elaity@okcu.edu. This Article is copyright 2009 by Eric T. Laity. The
research for this Article was made possible in part by a grant from the Kerr Foundation. I
received helpful comments from Julie Roin, Gary J. Miller, Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, and J.
Clifton Fleming. The remaining errors are mine.
1. Ronald H. Coase, The Wealth of Nations, 15 ECON. INQUIRY 309, 313 (July 1977)
(stating the question that Adam Smith posed for himself).
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between territorial and worldwide tax systems, the evaluation of tax
havens and appropriate responses, the use of anti-deferral regimes,
and the possible need for a multilateral tax treaty.
On this institutional foundation, the role of the state is both
essential and subordinate: sovereignty becomes an instrumental value
and national law-making is seen in terms of a conceptual subsidiarity,
to use the European term, or a consequentialist federalism in the
realm of global economic development. Moreover, non-state actors
facilitate sovereign competition and the benefits that such a
constraint on the abuse of sovereign discretion brings to the world’s
people.
The Article begins with an analogy. Consider the manager of a
complex organization. In order to obtain the best results, the manager
must delegate decision-making authority to others. Furthermore, the
delegation of decision-making authority must be accompanied by a
grant of autonomy to the subordinate decision-makers, if the manager
hopes to receive the full benefit of delegating decision-making
authority.
Unfortunately, subordinate decision-makers can abuse their
discretion. Subordinates might depart from the organization’s goal
and pursue their own objectives, possibly exploiting individuals under
their control along the way. Furthermore, subordinates might attempt
to shift their costs onto the budgets of other decision-makers on the
same plane of authority. To minimize the abuse of discretion, the
manager must create standards and limitations within which
subordinate decision-makers are to exercise their autonomy.
The delegation of decision-making authority to multiple
subordinates also creates collective action problems for those
subordinates. Hence, the manager of the complex organization must
encourage the development of social norms that coordinate collective
action within the organization.
We can summarize the task of the manager of a complex
organization. The manager must set the organization’s overall goal.
The manager must delegate decision-making authority and autonomy
to subordinates within the organization. And, finally, the manager
must create a decisional environment for those subordinates. The
decisional environment consists of standards and limitations to
minimize the abuse of delegated discretion and of social norms to
coordinate the subordinates’ collective action.
We can draw an analogy from the complex organization to the
community of nations. Of course, we have no actual manager for the
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community of nations. We must posit a hypothetical manager and,
following the lead of constitutional theory, we might refer to the
world’s people as the original source of authority for the community
of nations. Assume that the goal our hypothetical manager has set for
the community of nations is to improve our well-being. Assume, too,
that some level of global economic development is necessary to
provide the material basis for our well-being.
The nations of the world become the subordinate decisionmakers to whom the world’s people have delegated authority and
autonomy. Nations are to use their authority and autonomy to pursue
the goal of improving our well-being and, in particular, to pursue
some measure of global economic development.
Under the analogy, we must create a decisional environment for
the world’s nations that would allow us to benefit from decentralized
decision-making while reducing its drawbacks. The decisional
environment would consist, in part, of standards and limitations that
curb the abuse of sovereign discretion. The decisional environment
must also include the international equivalent of social norms that
alleviate collective action problems among nations. This decisional
environment defines the institutional competence of nations, an
institutional competence that aligns the decisions of nations with our
objective. When we shape the international decisional environment,
we engage in the institutional design of nations.
This article engages in the institutional design of nations by
proposing a decisional environment that would align national
decisions about taxation with the goal of global economic
development. The Article’s objective is to gain the benefits of
decentralized decision-making for the world’s economy, while
reducing the drawbacks. The Article assumes that the ultimate goals
of the world’s people require a measure of global economic
development for their realization, regardless of how those ultimate
goals may be defined.
This article proceeds as follows. Part I sets out the basic idea of
the institutional competence of nations in global economic
development. Part II describes the importance of using multiple
sovereign decision-makers for global economic development. Part III
addresses the abuse of sovereign discretion. It develops standards for
and limitations on national decision-making about economic
development, especially those applicable to the design of the
international provisions of national income tax codes. Part IV deals
with international collective action problems in global economic
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development, particularly those in international taxation.
International social norms, such as the proposed standards and
limitations, are the chief means for the coordination of national
decision-making in pursuit of global economic development.
Secondary norms aimed at key interest groups would enforce the
standards and limitations. The Conclusion gives a summary of the
Article’s implications for international tax law.
I. THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE OF NATIONS IN
GLOBAL ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
There is value to global economic development in having
multiple nations involved in the decision-making. We can recognize
some of that value by identifying the benefits to be derived from the
delegation of decision-making authority to others. We might view the
matter as a delegation of decision-making authority over global
economic development by the world’s people to the nations of the
world.
Nations use some of their decision-making authority to craft
environments for the economic development of their people. Those
environments include property rights, markets, the rule of law,
enabling law for privately created organizations, a bankruptcy regime,
decentralized decision-making, competition, regulatory regimes,
public infrastructure, an educated and healthy workforce, the
provision of public goods and services, and various burdens including
taxation and fees.2 Nations shape their economic environments for at
least two reasons: to influence the decision-making of enterprises in
favor of economic development and to enhance their tax revenue.
A nation also uses its decision-making authority to determine the
optimal size of its public sector, that is, the optimal size of the
aggregate of all activity funded by either tax revenue or public debt.
The size of a nation’s public sector is intertwined with its economic

2. See DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 81 (1990) (describing institutional characteristics that are crucial to effective
organization). Oliver Williamson calls adaptation the central problem of economic organization.
OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 327 (1996) [herinafter
WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS]. A government must create the conditions under which
transactions will be aligned with modes of organization in light of their adaptive needs and
capacities. See id. For vibrant development, nations must also offer credible commitments
against expropriation of investment and an independent judiciary to enforce hybrid modes of
governance created by the private sector. Id. at 330-33. Both are required if a nation is to attract
high-value intangibles. Id. at 332-33.
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development.3 The revenue needs of a public sector affect the rate at
which its economy grows. The tax burden on an economy necessarily
limits the rate of capital formation, an essential ingredient in
economic development. In this sense, the size of a nation’s public
sector is part of its economic environment. If a nation’s economy
grows, however, the nation’s increased tax receipts permit an increase
in the activities of its public sector. In this sense, a nation’s economic
development is subordinate to the long-term goals of its public sector.
A nation has a third decision to make from time to time
concerning economic development. A nation must determine the
distribution of the transition costs to higher standards of living.
Although economic development raises standards of living for a
population, the distribution of the benefit can be uneven; some
members of the population may actually be worse off after the change
to a higher overall standard of living. The nation must determine the
distribution of such a detriment within that population.
There are two hazards in the delegation of decision-making. The
first hazard is the decision-maker’s abuse of its discretion in making
decisions. We must limit a decision-maker’s exercise of discretion if
we are to reach the goal for which we have delegated decision-making
authority.
The abuse of discretion can take several forms. A decision-maker
can pursue goals other than the one for which it has been delegated
decision-making authority. This form of abuse generates agency costs
4
for the superior decision-maker. A decision-maker can also use its
discretion to exploit subordinate actors. Such exploitation gives rise
to a redistribution of wealth to actors who have captured the
decision-making process.5 Thirdly, a decision-maker can take
advantage of incomplete bargaining with other decision-makers on
the same plane of authority, encumbering those decision-makers with
externalities.6 Such opportunism can reduce the aggregate welfare of
the people for whom the decision-makers are responsible.

3. Douglass North characterizes the size of a nation’s public sector as one of the three
most important keys to economic performance in the modern world. The other two keys are
property rights and government regulation. NORTH, supra note 2, at 112.
4. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308-10 (1976).
5. See, e.g., MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 29 (Harvard Univ.
Press 1971).
6. See, e.g., GARY J. MILLER, MANAGERIAL DILEMMAS 36-57, 77-101 (1992).
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We can limit the abuse of sovereign discretion by specifying
standards for and limitations on the economic environments created
by sovereign decision-makers. Examples of those standards and
limitations might include democratic accountability for the sovereign
decision-maker and a code of human rights. Competition among
sovereigns in the design of their economic environments serves as
another limitation on their exploitation of subordinate actors. One of
the benefits of having multiple decision-makers on the same plane of
authority is the competition that is then possible.
The second hazard in the delegation of decision-making is the
creation of collective action problems. This hazard is distinctive to the
delegation of discretion to multiple decision-makers on the same
plane of authority. There may be desirable global states of affairs that
nations cannot reach through their individual efforts due to their
inability to coordinate their decision-making.
We can address collective action problems through the standards
and limitations we set on sovereign decision-making for economic
development. An example of those standards and limitations is a ban
on export subsidies. Thus, the standards and limitations on the design
of a nation’s economic environment address both abuses of sovereign
discretion and collective action problems. To the extent that they
address externalities and collective action problems, the standards
and limitations serve as a set of property rights for sovereign decisionmakers.
Without a central authority to enact into law the standards and
limitations we devise for national decision-making about economic
development, those standards and limitations can only be the
international equivalent of social norms. Furthermore, without a
central authority, the standards and limitations can only be enforced
through social norms of punishment. A sovereign failing to respect
the standards and limitations on economic decision-making would
subject itself to different treatment by other sovereigns. The
international norms of punishment would specify the measured
retaliation permitted in such an event.7
Thus, the standards and limitations on a sovereign’s decisionmaking about economic development would be of two kinds: a
primary set of standards and limitations applicable to the nation’s
relations with other nations that observe those norms, and a
secondary set applicable to the nation’s relations with violators. A
7. International norms of punishment in the tax area are discussed infra Pt. IV.B.
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nation’s tax code would have two sets of international provisions: one
set applicable to nations in compliance with the primary norms and
another set applicable to others.
We engage in institutional design when we formulate the
standards and limitations governing national decision-making about
8
global economic development. When applied to the international
provisions of national income tax codes, the standards and limitations
allocate among nations decision-making authority over the global
income tax base. More generally, the standards and limitations
allocate among nations the decision-making authority over global
economic development. The standards and limitations define the
institutional competence of nations in global economic development.
II. THE VALUE OF MULTIPLE SOVEREIGNS
We are engaged in the enterprise of global economic
development for the benefit of the world’s people. If we were starting
from scratch, we would have to devise an environment that would
foster economic development, taking into account the optimal size of
the public sector and a fair distribution of transition costs. We would
design that environment to influence the decision-making of
individuals and companies in favor of global economic development.
Our task would be easier and the result enhanced if we were to
delegate the matter to multiple independent decision-makers. Each
decision-maker would be responsible for creating a part of the global
economic environment. We might divide the responsibilities by
territory and make each decision-maker responsible for the people
living there.
Of course, we are not starting from scratch. There are multiple
nations in the world, and each is already engaged in crafting an
environment for the economic development of its people. Yet, it is
easy to overlook the value of multiple decision-makers in global
economic development and push for the unilateral projection of a
single nation’s economic environment throughout the world.
We can see the value of multiple decision-makers in global
economic development if we compare the arrangement to a complex
organization with a central decision-maker. The delegation of
decision-making authority by the central decision-maker improves

8. See also HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR 1-17 (4th ed. 1997)
(designing organizations to align the decision-making of individuals with the goals of the
organization).
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the organization’s performance.9 The improvement is greater if the
subordinate decision-makers have true autonomy; those subordinate
decision-makers must reap the benefits of their decisions and bear the
attendant burdens.10 Externalities between subordinate decisionmakers should be minimized: a decision-maker ought not to export its
costs to another decision-maker, nor to seize the benefits accruing to
another decision-maker. In the analogy to delegation within a
complex organization, sovereignty becomes an instrumental concept
based on the benefits to a complex organization of a grant of
autonomy to subordinate decision-makers.
The delegation of decision-making authority to autonomous
actors improves the performance of a complex organization in several
ways. First, delegation releases, for the benefit of the organization,
information and action otherwise withheld from the central decisionmaker. There are times when the incentives to withhold private
information are such that the holders of the information must be
given the authority to make the decisions for which such information
is required if the organization is to benefit from that information.11
Even if the information is obtainable by the central decision-maker, it
may be cheaper to delegate the decision-making to a person who
already holds the information. Moreover, subordinates may be
unwilling to implement central decisions if they have not participated
in the decisions. Furthermore, the role of ignored or spurned interest
groups in blocking local action or the revelation of local information
should not be overlooked.12
In the case of global economic development, European Union
economic policy gains the benefit of local information and action
through the requirement that Union directives be implemented

9. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 77-82. We may draw a parallel to the decentralization
theorem of public economics. Under the theorem, the devolution of authority from a central
government to local governments may increase the likelihood of innovation in public goods and
of satisfying residents’ preferences for public goods. See also William W. Bratton & Joseph A.
McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: Devolutionary Federalism in a
Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 215-16, 261-62 (1997).
10. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 216-21.
11. See id. at 139 (“the strategic misrepresentation of hidden information is itself the most
profound obstacle to effective hierarchical performance”).
12. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 106-13 (describing peer pressure within interdependent
work groups to mask the potential productivity of the group); see also DANIEL A. FARBER &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 19 (1991) (discussing the effectiveness of interest
groups in blocking proposed legislation) (citing K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED
INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317 (1986)).
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through national legislation.13 National legislation can take local
conditions, institutions, and practices into account. More generally,
the construction of the global economic environment can benefit
from local information and action if the construction is delegated to
sovereign decision-makers.
A second benefit of delegation within a complex organization is
the promotion of a variety of approaches to the organization’s overall
goal. This variety is due in part to the release of hidden information
and action. The variety is also due to the Bendor effect: the
delegation of authority to multiple independent subordinates
improves the likelihood of generating new approaches to the
14
organization’s ultimate goal.
In the case of global economic development, delegation would
promote a variety of approaches to the creation of an economic
environment conducive to development. Such variety is valuable to us
because it enables us to use the comparative method to evaluate the
efficacy of different economic environments, and, through that
method, partly to overcome our inevitable lack of information about
endowments, our inability to use controlled experiments in the public
sphere, and the inevitable incompleteness of decision-making.15
In a world of perfect information, we would know the
distribution of endowments within a society that would produce the
highest standard of living for that society, given each individual
member’s preferences. In such a world, we would also know the
existing distribution of endowments and thus the changes needed to
achieve the optimal distribution. But, we cannot know the
information necessary to determine or reach the optimal distribution
of endowments for a society.16 The members of society have an
incentive not to disclose the necessary information to us, which
13. For the requirement of national implementation of directives, see Treaty Establishing
the European Community art. 249, Nov. 10, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 3.
14. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 79-80 (citing JONATHAN BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS:
REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT 47 (1985)).
15. The comparative method is championed by transaction cost economics, among other
schools. Transaction cost economics assesses “the comparative efficacy of alternative
governance structures for harmonizing ex-post contractual relations.” WILLIAMSON,
MECHANISMS, supra note 2, at 177; see id. at 93-119. The comparative method mitigates the
difficulty of measuring transaction costs. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 21-22 (The Free Press 1985) [hereinafter WILLIAMSON,
INSTITUTIONS]. The choice of institutions for a nation’s economic environment involves tradeoffs, even among efficiency attributes. We need a variety of institutional mixes for study. See
WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS supra note 2, at 93-119.
16. See AMARTYA SEN, ON ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 36 (1987).
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includes information about their existing endowments. Such
information remains essentially private.
We cannot run controlled experiments to determine the optimal
distribution of endowments. It’s not politically feasible to redistribute
17
endowments, even on a temporary basis. A legislature with fully
informed interest groups could not pursue the redistribution of
endowments needed to reach the optimal distribution. Any
inducement a person was paid to agree to the change would have to
be counted toward that person’s ideal starting position. Hence, we
would have to lie about the ideal initial distribution of endowments.
Nor could we verify the level of redistributed endowments, because
we cannot determine the pre-existing distribution of endowments.
Without determining the pre-existing distribution of endowments, we
could not establish a control group, either.
A variety of approaches to the creation of an economic
environment ameliorates the inevitable incompleteness of decisionmaking. Decision-makers make incomplete decisions, but the
decisions are incomplete in different ways: decision-making is
18
bounded by circumstances specific to the decision-maker. The
alternatives we consider will be limited to those that we can imagine
and further limited, by constraints on our time and resources, to those
alternatives that intuitively seem most useful to analyze.19 The
consequences we determine for those alternatives will be limited to
those we can imagine and further limited by our expectations about
what the actions of others will be.20 Because the time and information
available for making a decision are limited, we must assume the truth
or falsehood of some of the imagined consequences of an alternative.
Our choice among sets of consequences will be limited partly by the
sunk costs of our previous decisions.21 Our choice is more difficult if
values are specific to concrete situations and therefore difficult to
22
anticipate. Because decision-making time and attention are scarce
resources, we devise habits, rules, and routines to conserve those
23
resources. Those habits in turn limit the alternatives and
consequences we consider. A decision-maker faced with the demands
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

See id. at 37.
See SIMON, supra note 8, at 45-47.
See id. at 94, 96-97, 109.
See id. at 78, 80-82, 93.
See id. at 77-78.
See id. at 93, 95-96.
See id. at 89.
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of rational choice may be tempted to identify with a group or role to
24
reduce those demands.
A third benefit of delegation within complex organizations is the
competition it makes possible among decision-makers. The central
decision-maker for the organization sets the terms of competition to
encourage decision-makers to adopt the better approaches devised
25
within the group or to formulate a more promising approach. In the
case of global economic development, we would like sovereign
decision-makers to adopt the better approaches to fostering economic
development. Competition among nations is an aid to the diffusion of
best practices. There is no central decision-maker setting the terms of
competition, however. In order for sovereign competition to function,
constituents must have the power to choose among national economic
environments and the power to change incumbent officials.26
A fourth benefit of delegation within a complex organization is
the improved decision-making it produces for the organization as a
whole when unified action is needed. The Condorcet jury theory
suggests that the alternative chosen by a group of autonomous
decision-makers among the alternatives available will be better than
27
the selection made by a single central decision-maker. In the case of
global economic development, global decision-making is needed to
select standards for and limitations on the creation of economic
environments. The use of multiple sovereign decision-makers to
make the selection should improve the chances that the best
standards and limitations are selected.
III. STANDARDS FOR AND LIMITATIONS ON SOVEREIGN
DECISION-MAKING
By reminding ourselves of the benefits of delegating decisionmaking authority within a complex organization, we recognized the
benefits of having multiple sovereign decision-makers for global
24. See id. at 280-88.
25. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 457 (1977) (describing the rise and structure of the multidivisional firm,
with central management evaluating the performance of the firm’s divisions and allocating
capital among the divisions). A multi-divisional company adds to the holding company structure
the capabilities of strategic planning and resource allocation and the apparatus necessary for
monitoring and control. See WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 281.
26. These two powers of constituents permit the Tiebout and Salmon mechanisms to
induce competition among governments. See ALBERT BRETON, COMPETITIVE GOVERNMENTS:
AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF POLITICS AND PUBLIC FINANCE 229-35 (1996).
27. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 80-82.
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economic development. If we remind ourselves of the drawbacks of
delegating authority within a complex organization, we can recognize
the hazards inherent in having multiple sovereign decision-makers.
Subordinate decision-makers within a complex organization may
abuse their discretion and depart from the organization’s goals. The
departures impose agency costs on the organization and may exploit
individuals or impose externalities on other decision-makers on the
same plane of authority. To curb those departures, the organization
must align the self-interest of its subordinate decision-makers with its
goals. The organization’s central decision-maker must design
standards for and limitations on the subordinate decision-makers’
exercise of discretion.
So, too, sovereign decision-makers may depart from our goal of
global economic development as they craft their environments for
economic development. If we are to avoid such departures, we must
develop standards for and limitations on the exercise of sovereign
discretion. The task of the standards and limitations is to align
national self-interest, or more precisely, the self-interest of national
decision-makers and the members of interest groups participating in
domestic political and legislative processes, with our goal. Thus,
sovereign decision-making is to foster national economic
development that is consistent with global economic development.
Our objective may also define the limits of private choice among the
national economic environments.28
We can restate our enterprise in more general terms. Once we
acknowledge the benefit of delegating decision-making authority in
global economic development to multiple decision-makers, we must
restrict the range of preferences that sovereign decision-makers may
entertain in making their decisions if our overall goal of global
economic development is to be served. A restricted range of national
preferences is required if we are to retain at least the benefits of
Pareto optimality in global economic development and transitivity in
29
our global choices.

28. For a discussion of anti-abuse rules, see infra Pt. IV.A.1. For a discussion of possible
limits on private choice among national regulatory regimes, see Joel P. Trachtman, Economic
Analysis of Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 25-27 (2001). Trachtman would limit
private choice among mandatory provisions of national regulatory law in order to retain such
law’s protection of third parties. Id. at 5-6.
29. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 86-101 (discussing the Sen Paradox, a corollary to Arrow’s
Theorem).
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A. The Abuse of Sovereign Discretion
The abuse of sovereign discretion has several causes. The selfinterest of a nation’s decision-makers may lead to the abuse of
sovereign discretion. The activity many elected officials find
personally satisfying is meeting with and serving constituents. The
self-interest of those officials is furthered by re-election to office and
a generous budget with which to meet constituents’ needs. Economic
development serves the self-interest of a nation’s public decisionmakers if it minimizes unemployment during elections and increases
the nation’s tax revenues. A government might envision the creation
of an environment for vibrant economic development as an
investment it makes with the expectation of an increase in its future
revenues and the employment of its people.30 A vibrant economic
environment enhances the value of the government’s net profits
interest in its private enterprises and its net revenue interest in its
people’s consumption. The immediate needs of incumbent public
decision-makers, however, can lead them to subvert the long-term
benefits from economic development by seizing additional revenue or
creating unsustainable employment in the present term.
Organized groups that participate in the domestic political and
law-making processes contribute to the abuse of sovereign discretion.
In general, economic interest groups would like to reduce the burden
of competition. They strive to reduce that burden through the
segmentation of markets, the erection of barriers to entry, and public
subsidies of their costs. When nations introduce protectionist
measures to segment global markets into national ones or subsidize
their enterprises’ participation in global markets, they depart from
the goal of global economic development. The departure imposes
agency costs on the world community, which are borne by voters
everywhere. By increasing the costs to consumers within the enacting
nation’s jurisdiction, the departure exploits those subordinate actors
through a redistribution of wealth. By imposing externalities on other
nations’ economic environments, the departure is opportunistic. Such
externalities interfere with the effectiveness of nations’ decisionmaking about their economic environments.

30. William Barker sees the basis for a nation’s income tax to be the value the nation has
added “to the world.” He sees this basis as neither the benefit conferred by a nation upon the
taxpayer nor the taxpayer’s ability to pay. William B. Barker, Optimal International Taxation
and Tax Competition: Overcoming the Contradictions, 22 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 161, 162, 186-88
(2002).
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A nation’s decision-makers and its organized groups can
combine to redistribute wealth through the design of institutions for
its national economic environment. The choice and design of
institution depends on the transaction costs borne by three groups of
actors: sponsoring legislators, interested constituents, and the holders
of residual interests.31 The members of the sponsoring legislative
coalition incur decision-making costs as well as the commitment costs
of making the redistribution durable through subsequent legislative
sessions. Interested constituents not only bear the usual agency costs
of pursuing their goals through representatives and the costs of
unintended consequences, but they also must evaluate the cost of
participating in the subsequent interpretation and enforcement of
their legislated benefits. The holders of the residual interests in
government intervention include taxpayers, competitors, holders of
public debt, and consumers. The costs to consumers of organizing to
champion the benefits from economic development as a
counterweight to redistribution are thought to be sufficiently high to
prevent consumers from having an effective voice in government.32
Thus, the standards and limitations for sovereign discretion must
champion the interests of consumers.
The transaction costs of those three groups shape the preferences
of the individuals composing the legislative coalition. The coalition’s
choice of institution depends in part on the relative homogeneity of
33
the legislators’ preferences. Complete decisions can be made by a
legislature when the range of legislator preferences on an issue is
limited. When a legislature does not have sufficiently homogeneous
preferences on an issue to enact comprehensive legislation, but the

31. See MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR 13-22 (1995). Some of the transaction costs
considered by enacting coalitions and their supporters in their choice of institution to deliver
durable benefits include the ease of subsequent intervention in the affairs of the institution, the
relative lack of transparency afforded by the institution for pursuing redistributive goals, the
means of funding redistributive goals (for example, through a statutory monopoly or through
cross-subsidies by regulation), the political strength of the residual claimants (who under the
circumstances can include competitors, consumers, taxpayers, or government creditors), the
commitment costs of special privileges for the institution, the degree to which management must
be decentralized (which raises agency costs), and the ability of beneficiaries to sustain an
ongoing interest in the management of the institution.
32. For this reason, free trade legislation must be championed by industries that benefit
from the elimination of trade barriers, despite the significant benefits to consumers from such
legislation. Without those industrial proxies for consumers, free trade legislation would be
blocked by those industries losing economic rent through the elimination of trade barriers.
33. See HORN, supra note 31, at 15.
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range of preferences is still fairly well contained, the legislature will
enact legislation that delegates further decision-making to a
hierarchy, such as an administrative agency, a for-profit enterprise, or
a non-profit enterprise. Tax expenditures can subsidize for-profit
organizations or use them as administrators for subsidies to their
employees. A hierarchy can make more detailed decisions than a
legislature can because of the centralized authority of the executive
and through a further restriction of the set of preferences held by
individuals within the hierarchy through a combination of incentive
systems, personnel selection, and the creation and maintenance of
34
social norms.
Where the range of preferences in the legislature is broad
enough to prevent delegation to a hierarchy, but sufficiently limited
to permit the legislature to enact vague legislation, the legislature in
35
effect delegates more detailed decision-making to the courts. When
the range of legislators’ preferences is too broad to permit any
legislation, the decision-making is left to the markets and their
existing hierarchies. The existing hierarchies grapple with collective
action problems arising in circumstances of interdependent work or
limited information, and the markets are able to make decisions
under other circumstances.36
A sovereign decision-maker must be concerned with the abuse
by subordinate actors, including private enterprises, of any discretion
it confers upon them. We will have occasion later in this Article to
take up anti-abuse rules.
B. Standards to Reduce the Abuse of Sovereign Discretion
As we design the institutional competence of nations for global
economic development, our challenge is to preserve the benefits of
having multiple, autonomous decision-makers while curbing their
abuses of discretion. We may curb the abuse of sovereign discretion
through the creation of standards for and limitations on the exercise
of discretion in shaping an environment for global economic

34. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 58-74, 86-101, 179-81 (comparing decision-making by
voting and by hierarchy, and the restriction of preferences within a hierarchy).
35. See HORN, supra note 31, at 15 (describing the broad range of preferences within a
legislature creating high legislative transaction costs, leading to vague legislation). The
vagueness of such legislation gives courts discretion in its interpretation and application.
36. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 31-34; Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production,
Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972).
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development.37 Standards structure how a sovereign exercises its
discretion within its sphere of autonomy, while limitations define the
boundaries between sovereigns’ spheres of autonomy. Standards
address the exploitation of individuals subject to the sovereign’s
authority and the agency costs that arise from exploitation. In
contrast, limitations address opportunism in international relations
and the agency costs that arise from opportunism.
By curbing abuses of sovereign discretion, the standards and
limitations help to define the institutional competence of nations in
the realm of global economic development. Such institutional
competence can then serve as the common foundation for the norms
of international trade and taxation. The norms of international
taxation must preserve the benefits for global economic development
of having multiple autonomous decision-makers, while observing the
standards and limitations on the exercise of sovereign discretion.38
Many of the standards and limitations that define the
institutional competence of nations in global economic development
already exist and are recognized in other contexts. Other standards
and limitations have yet to be adopted.
I take up standards first. Some of the standards for the exercise
of sovereign discretion govern a nation’s political and legal processes,
while other standards affect the structure of a nation’s markets, the
design of national legislation, and competition among sovereigns.
1. Standards for Political and Legal Processes
Standards that govern political and legal processes reduce the
exploitation of individuals by making it more difficult for national
decision-makers and organized groups to redistribute wealth to
themselves through those processes. Such standards include
democratic accountability, a code of individual rights, an independent
judiciary, and the rule of law. Federal systems of government might
be necessary for nations with large populations. Federal systems
prevent central governments from delegating too little decisionmaking authority to political subdivisions or giving those subdivisions
too little autonomy in their decision-making for effective economic

37. These standards and limitations are the international equivalent of social norms and
are created through treaties and customary international law. See supra Pt. I and infra Pt. IV.
38. This Article suggests three norms of international taxation. See infra Pt. III.C.2.

LAITY_FMT2.1..DOC

2009]

1/28/2009 12:01:34 PM

THE COMPETENCE OF NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL TAX LAW

203

development. Federal systems may also give credibility to a
39
government’s commitment not to seize the property of its people.
Transparency in and auditing of government expenditures also
are useful standards. For example, the World Bank required the
Republic of Chad, as a condition to financing the construction of an
oil pipeline, to direct the payment of all pipeline revenues into an
account controlled by a third person. Funds in the account can only
40
be used for expenditures that benefit the people of Chad. Such an
arrangement inhibits the clandestine transfer of pipeline revenues to
an elite. The arrangement also helps pipeline customers avoid charges
of complicity in any future governmental malfeasance.
2. Standards for the Structure of Markets
Standards for competition among enterprises enhance consumer
welfare, even in opposition to groups that seek economic rents
through industrial structure and restraints on trade. Standards for
competition remove impediments that otherwise would segment a
market and shelter enterprises from the pressures of competition. A
sovereign’s failure to use its discretion for the benefit of its consumers
exploits those individuals in the sense that enterprises continue to
benefit from the existing segmented structure of the markets. To the
extent that the sovereign’s failure has decreased the rate of its
people’s economic development from what is feasible, the failure has
generated agency costs.
3. Standards of Neutrality for Legislation
Standards are needed to counteract the legislative exploits of
organized groups. The norms of the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT) impose standards of neutrality on national lawmaking.41 These standards assist in the promotion of competition by
creating even larger markets. The standards of neutrality include
nondiscrimination – national treatment and most favored nation
treatment – and transparency.42 These standards remove impediments

39. See Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions as Governance Structures: The Political
Foundations of Secure Markets, 149 J. INST’L & THEORETICAL ECON. 286, 287-90 (1993).
40. See Oil in Chad, ECONOMIST, Sept. 14, 2002, at 49.
41. See PAUL B. STEPHAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS: LAW AND
POLICY 875 (3d ed. 2004) (“In essence, the GATT advances liberal norms (unhampered
[international] movement of goods, capital and people) . . . .”).
42. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade arts. I, III, XI, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT] (containing the most favored nation treatment for
GATT members, national treatment of foreign-produced products in matters of taxation and
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at the international level that otherwise would segment national
markets by a product’s national origin or would segment international
markets along national or regional lines. Standards of neutrality
impede rent-seeking by sub-national groups, which market
segmentation would facilitate.
Standards that counter the legislative exploits of organized
groups also affect the design of national income tax codes. Organized
groups attempt to influence the design of tax codes to skew the
burden of public expenditure away from themselves. The intent of
organized groups can be countered by standards of neutrality similar
to those embodied by the norms of GATT.
A tax code ought to be a neutral factor in business and
investment decisions made within a nation’s own economic
environment. An income tax code should not change the relative
43
prices of goods and services in the private sector. To achieve a
neutral effect on relative prices, the distribution of the burden of
public expenditure should be neutral among similarly situated
taxpayers. Neutrality in the taxation of similarly situated taxpayers,
sometimes known as horizontal equity, also preserves the benefits of
the delegation by sovereigns of decision-making authority to multiple
enterprises within their economic environments. In those
circumstances, equity is a means to institutional efficiency.
Furthermore, a tax code should not discriminate between a domestic
enterprise of a foreign entity and a domestic enterprise of a domestic
entity. A tax code should be neutral as between the two. Moreover, a
tax code should not discriminate against a resident taxpayer’s foreign
production. Lastly, the norm of transparency requires that the tax
subsidies in a tax code be identified and included in the national
budgeting process.
Tax norms of neutrality keep a tax system from contributing to
the segmentation of a nation’s markets. If competitors as similarly
situated taxpayers labor under different income tax rates and if the
traditional assumption that the incidence of the corporate income tax
falls entirely on shareholders is false, then the tax system has raised a

regulation, and transparency in measures restricting trade by converting all such measures into
monetary charges, respectively). The norm of most favored nation treatment requires each
GATT member to make available to all other members any trade benefit it makes available to
any single member. Under the norm of national treatment, a member of GATT must treat
foreign-produced products the same as it treats domestically produced products for purposes of
taxation and regulation.
43. Barker, supra note 30, at 188-89.
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semi-permeable boundary between those competitors.44 If some of
those competitors are foreign investors, the tax code has segmented
markets along national lines.
4. Sovereign Competition as a Standard
There is another standard that has the potential to reduce the
exploitation of individuals by organized groups through political and
legislative processes. Competition among sovereigns in the design of
national economic environments reduces the exploitation of
individuals by organized groups.45 A nation’s need to maintain living
standards similar to those enjoyed in neighboring countries is a useful
check on rent-seeking by economic groups. Furthermore, sovereign
46
competition may lead to tax reform. A nation’s need to broaden its
tax base and reduce its tax rate acts as a counterweight to the
inevitable pressure for tax subsidies and benefits residual groups who
otherwise would bear the cost of tax subsidies through higher tax
rates.47 Tax competition may also lessen the discrimination against
foreign investors, who otherwise present a tempting source of
48
additional revenue external to a nation’s electorate. In this sense,
competition supports the standard of nondiscrimination for the
legislative process. Moreover, sovereign competition helps to
generate and evaluate different national environments for economic
development.
The movement of individuals and enterprises among nations
promotes sovereign competition. The free movement of capital
among national economic environments, then, must be a standard for
49
the exercise of sovereign discretion. A national tax code generally

44. For a discussion of the incidence of a corporate income tax, see infra Pt. III.D.2.
45. See also Albert Breton et al., Decentralization and Subsidiarity: Toward a Theoretical
Reconciliation, 19 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 21, 43 (1998) (“[C]ompetition facilitates the control
and regulation of the exercise of political power.”).
46. See also ORG. FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEV., HARMFUL TAX
COMPETITION: AN EMERGING ISSUE 13-14 (1998) [hereinafter OECD]. “Globalization has also
been one of the driving forces behind tax reforms, which have focused on base broadening and
rate reductions, thereby minimizing tax induced distortions.” Id. at 13.
47. Note, however, that such tax reform may be accompanied by increased government
borrowing to fund direct subsidies that replace the tax subsidies.
48. See Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on International Tax
Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 580-85 (2001) (funding a state’s redistributive goals through
discriminatory taxation of foreign investors).
49. Removing impediments to foreign portfolio investment can be beneficial to a nation’s
capital markets. See PAUL R. KRUGMAN & MAURICE OBSTFELD, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 652-53 (4th ed. 1997); Barry Eichengreen et al., Capital
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should not impede the movement of investment among nations. In
particular, a nation’s tax code should not discriminate against the
foreign investment of its residents, if sovereign competition is to serve
its purpose.50 A sovereign ought not to tie its investors to its own
51
capital markets.
International capital markets also encourage sovereign
competition. The pricing of sovereign debt transmits useful
information about the relative success of national economic
environments in fostering economic development.
C. Limitations on the Abuse of Sovereign Discretion
The other kind of measure that reduces the abuse of sovereign
discretion in the shaping of an economic environment are limitations.
Limitations reduce opportunism in international economic relations
by making the cross-border transfer of costs and benefits more
difficult for national decision-makers and organized groups.
Limitations serve a function among nations similar to that of property
rights.
Within their spheres of autonomy and subject to the standards
for exercising sovereign discretion, nations would experiment in the
design of their economic environments. A comparative evaluation of
those economic environments will help us identify those promoting

Account Liberalization: Theoretical and Practical Aspects 12 (Int’l Monetary Fund Occasional
Paper 172, 1998). The greater supply of portfolio capital should lower the cost of capital in that
nation. Suppliers of portfolio capital are subject to behavioral peculiarities documented by
behavioral economists; those peculiarities lead to crises in capital markets, which need to be
buffered. See Jagdish Bhagwati, The Capital Myth: The Difference Between Trade in Widgets and
Dollars, 77 FOREIGN AFF., May-June 1998, at 7; but see Economics Focus: Capital
Controversies, ECONOMIST, May 21, 1998, at 72 (partly taking issue with Bhagwati’s article).
Removing impediments to foreign direct investment may also be beneficial. Foreign direct
investment does not contribute supply to a nation’s capital markets, but does provide additional
production for the nation’s other markets.
50. At present, neither international trade law nor international tax law prohibits a
residence nation’s discrimination against foreign production by its residents. See Alvin C.
Warren, Jr., Income Tax Discrimination Against International Commerce, 54 TAX. L. REV. 131,
158 (2001). An example of such discrimination is accelerated depreciation available only for
equipment used domestically. Id. Other examples include the limitation of shareholder
imputation credits to dividends attributable to domestic source income. Id. at 154.
51. The Netherlands violated the Treaty of Rome’s provision requiring free movement of
capital when the Dutch income tax system gave imputation credits to shareholders only for
dividends received from Dutch companies and not for dividends received from other EU
companies. Case C-35/98, Staatssecretaris van Financiën v. B.G.M. Verkooijen, 2000 E.C.R. I4071. Under the Dutch imputation system, Dutch portfolio investors had an incentive to
participate only in Dutch equity markets.
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robust development. To preserve those experiments and the integrity
of our comparative evaluation, we must avoid the imposition of
externalities by one economic environment on another. Limitations
are the measures channeling sovereign discretion that reduce the
imposition of externalities between national spheres of autonomy.
52
Consider the drawbacks of sovereign competition. Competition
among sovereigns can take the form of the imposition of costs by one
sovereign on another’s economic environment or the taking of
benefits by one sovereign from another’s economic environment. The
imposition of externalities transfers wealth from one sovereign to
another (possibly with a net loss of wealth), impairs the effectiveness
of the burdened sovereign’s economic environment, and distorts the
economic decision-making of both sovereigns.
The cause of opportunistic competition among sovereigns lies
with the national decision-makers and organized groups of the
exploiting sovereign. In the case of a cost, the constituents of the
burdened sovereign become an additional residual group to bear the
cost of the exploiting sovereign’s national legislation (a residual group
to which the national decision-makers of the exploiting sovereign are
not accountable, even in theory). In the case of a benefit, the nation’s
decision-makers seek additional revenue without burdening their own
constituents and reducing the rate of capital formation within their

52. Reuven Avi-Yonah fears that technological change and tax competition among nations
may reduce global tax revenue over time. The use of electronic commerce rather than
permanent establishments to distribute goods and services will shift taxable income from
consumption jurisdictions to production jurisdictions. Furthermore, competition among nations
as production jurisdictions will encourage business entities to transfer their production to
production tax havens. The shift of the global tax base in favor of production tax havens will
reduce business income tax receipts in consumption jurisdictions. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REV.
1573, 1586-97 (2000) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Globalization]; see also OECD, supra note 46, at
14 (tax competition reducing nations’ ability to meet redistributive goals through tax revenue). I
have several comments on Avi-Yonah’s assertion. First, we should not lose sight of our overall
goal: economic development that increases the well-being of the world’s people. If such shifts
improve the well-being of the world’s people, we should welcome them. Tax revenue is not the
highest good. Second, if such shifts are accompanied by greater global economic development,
any shifts may well be accompanied by an increase in the global tax base, especially when we
take into account personal income and aggregate payrolls. Third, tax jurisdictions aren’t
necessarily fungible. Their marginal costs and benefits will differ in offering compelling
economic environments to foreign investment. Without fungibility, tax competition will be
limited. See Roin, supra note 48, at 543, 554-62, 568-80. Fourth, transaction costs or “frictions”
may stymie tax competition. See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 9, at 231-39, 260 (identifying
the frictions of externalities, costs of mobility, bundled public goods, asymmetric information,
spillovers, and the possible lack of entrepreneurs in public goods).
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own economy. The burden of the revenue taken from another
sovereign falls on that nation’s constituents and economy.
In the case of a complex organization, the central decision-maker
must limit opportunistic competition among the organization’s
subordinate decision-makers if the organization is to benefit fully
from the grant of autonomy to those decision-makers. So, too, in the
case of global economic development, we must limit opportunistic
competition among nations if we are to benefit fully from the
participation of multiple sovereigns in the shaping of the global
economic environment.
Limitations on a sovereign’s decision-making address
opportunism by prohibiting subsidies and taxation that invade other
sovereigns’ spheres of autonomy over the global economic
environment.
1. Limitations on Subsidies.
The norms of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) address opportunistic sovereign competition executed
through subsidies. GATT prohibits export subsidies, which
ameliorate the general burden of a nation’s economic environment
for those engaged in international trade and increase the profit
53
margin of exporters. Export subsidies can also be an attempt to keep
a non-competitive feature of a nation’s economic environment in
place but to waive it for the benefit of exporters. Tax expenditures
that subsidize exports are subject to the norms of GATT.54 GATT
also permits measured retaliation against domestic subsidies of
specific impact, which generally are elements of a national economic
environment that benefit specific industries.55 Both kinds of subsidies

53. For the prohibition on export subsidies, see GATT, supra note 42, art. XVI; Agreement
on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art. 3.1(a), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1 LEGAL INSTRUMENTS – RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND (1994) [hereinafter SCM Agreement]. At present, the ban on export
subsidies only reaches trade in goods. Neither GATT nor the SCM Agreement reaches export
subsidies for services or investment.
54. See SCM Agreement, supra note 53, art. 1, ¶ 1.1(a)(1)(ii); Paul R. McDaniel, Trade and
Taxation, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1621, 1637-39 (2001). An exemption system in itself does not
constitute an illegal export subsidy under GATT, although its application to transactions that
originate in the residence state is an export subsidy under GATT. McDaniel, supra, at 1628.
55. See SCM Agreement, supra note 53, art. 2, ¶ 2.1. In addition to having specific impact,
domestic subsidies must also be contingent upon either export performance or the use of
domestic goods over imported goods. Id. art. 3, ¶ 3.1.
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skew competition among private enterprises in international
56
markets.
The GATT approach generally encourages the modification of
the nation’s economic environment so the non-competitive element is
eliminated for all actors and the beneficial element is either made
57
available to all or to no one. In this sense, GATT requires sovereign
competition to affect all of a sovereign’s constituents when it
indirectly affects the constituents of other sovereigns. GATT’s norms
dealing with subsidies thus indirectly act as standards reducing the
exploitation of a sovereign’s own constituents through non-uniform
treatment. More generally, we should encourage competition among
sovereigns on the basis of the uniform application of their economic
environments and not on the basis of departures from selected
elements of a national economic environment, if we are to avoid the
exploitation of members of residual groups by organized groups.
2. Limitations on Taxation.
Limitations also promote global economic development by
defining a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over the global income tax
base. The limitations define the opportunistic taking of revenue by
58
one sovereign from another sovereign’s economic environment. In

56. Paul McDaniel identifies three negative effects of export subsidies, including those
distributed through tax subsidies: the skewing of sales away from third-country producers who
have a comparative advantage over the subsidized producers, the missed opportunity by the
subsidized producers to achieve new efficiencies, and possible retaliation by third countries
through competing subsidies. See Paul R. McDaniel, Trade Agreements and Income Taxation:
Interactions, Conflicts, and Resolutions, 57 TAX L. REV. 275, 295 (2004) [hereinafter, McDaniel,
Trade Agreements]. Export subsidies may also increase the value of the subsidizing nation’s
currency, reducing the benefit of the subsidy without reducing its cost to the nation’s taxpayers.
See id. at 296.
57. The GATT approach is reflected in the panel report on U.S. foreign sales corporations:
The United States is free to maintain a world wide tax system, a territorial tax
system or any other system it sees fit. This is not the business of the WTO.
What it is not free to do is to establish a regime of direct taxation, provide an
exemption from direct taxes specifically related to exports, and then claim it is
entitled to provide such an export subsidy because it is necessary to eliminate a
disadvantage to exporters created by the US tax system itself. In our view, this
is no different from imposing a corporate tax of, say, 75 per cent, and then
arguing that a special tax rate of 25 per cent for exporters is necessary because
the generally applicable corporate tax rates in other Members is only 25
percent.
Panel Report, United States - Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations”, ¶ 7.122,
WT/DS108/R (Oct. 8, 1999) (footnote omitted).
58. Daniel Shaviro calls such opportunism “tax exportation.” Through tax exportation, a
government places a burden on outsiders who neither consent to the burden nor share in the
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general, a national income tax code ought not to impose externalities
on other nations if our economic decision-making is to be sound.
There are several kinds of externalities we must avoid. We must
avoid externalities that impair the benefits of having multiple
sovereigns involved in global economic development. Furthermore,
we must avoid externalities that impair incentives for other nations to
foster economic development, including capital formation. Moreover,
we must avoid externalities that impair the competitiveness of other
nations’ markets.
Our overall goal of global economic development gives us three
limitations on the design of national tax codes. First, a nation must
have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the income derived from
business operations conducted within its territory.59 Second, a nation

benefit funded by the burden. Daniel Shaviro, An Economic and Political Look at Federalism
in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 895, 908 (1992).
59. To the extent that such things can be predicted, there apparently would not be a
revenue loss if the United States moved to an exemption system for the taxation of business
income. Tax revenue for the United States might actually increase. See Harry Grubert, Enacting
Dividend Exemption and Tax Revenue, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 811, 816-17 (2001) (estimating a
revenue increase of nine billion dollars annually, assuming that foreign-source royalty income
continues to be subject to residence-based taxation [under an exemption system, foreign-source
royalty income could no longer be sheltered by excess foreign tax credits]); see also Keith Engel,
Tax Neutrality to the Left, International Competitiveness to the Right, Stuck in the Middle with
Subpart F, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1525, 1568 (2001). This possible revenue enhancement affects the
use of an exemption system to encourage investment in developing nations. Michael Graetz
discusses the use of the international aspects of a nation’s tax code to redistribute future income
to developing nations through the encouragement of foreign investment. See Michael J. Graetz,
Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory
Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 300-01, 309 (2001). The shift to an exemption system apparently
would eliminate one of the existing incentives for multinational business to invest in production
facilities in low tax jurisdictions: the need to absorb taxes from high-tax jurisdictions through
cross-crediting. For additional analysis of the needs of developing nations and the international
provisions of national tax codes, see Karen B. Brown, Harmful Tax Competition: The OECD
View, 32 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 311 (1999). For the U.S. tax system, David
Rosenbloom proposes to ignore the corporate form of foreign subsidiaries and to exempt from
U.S.-residence-based taxation the business profits of branches and subsidiaries attributable to
permanent establishments in nations that appear on a list of nations with well-developed tax
systems. See H. David Rosenbloom, From the Bottom Up: Taxing the Income of Foreign
Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1525, 1544-48 (2001). All other income of the
foreign subsidiaries would be taxed currently by the United States with a deduction for foreign
income taxes paid. Id. at 1548-50. The gain on appreciated property transferred to a permanent
establishment would also be taxed currently. Id. at 1552-53. Rosenbloom’s proposal would
eliminate the foreign tax credit and Subpart F, but would not address the reincorporation of
multinational enterprises in tax havens. Robert Peroni points out the temptation for the federal
government to delist countries as a weapon of foreign relations. Robert J. Peroni, The Proper
Approach for Taxing the Income of Foreign Controlled Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L.
1579, 1590-91 (2001).
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must have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over portfolio income
derived anywhere in the world from capital accumulated within its
60
territory. Third, a nation’s tax code must be transparent to the tax
authorities of other nations when the code acts as a conduit for
portfolio investment by residents of other nations.
These three limitations are based in part on the value to global
economic development of the use of multiple sovereign decisionmakers in the shaping of the global economic environment. We have
seen that the use of multiple autonomous decision-makers gives us,
among other things, a variety of approaches in the design of national
61
economic environments. That variety is essential because it enables
us to use the comparative method to evaluate the relative efficacy of
different economic environments, thus partly overcoming our
inherent lack of information about endowments, our inability to use
controlled experiments in the public sphere, and the inevitable
incompleteness of decision-making.62 It is only through the
comparison of different economic environments that we can
determine the effect of different institutional arrangements on
economic performance. The use of multiple sovereign decisionmakers also gives us the benefit of sovereign competition.63 Sovereign
competition forces nations to be attentive to the cultivation of their
economic environments.
Low-income nations that suffer from chronically poor economic
performance usually have institutional arrangements that impede
effective economic change. An international decisional environment
that promotes global economic development should encourage
government decision-makers in low-income nations to create better
economies. We have already discussed the role in economic
development of standards for government decision-making. The
creation of a stronger economy also depends on government decisionmakers shaping an economic environment that presents proper
incentives to public and private entrepreneurs to engage in
productive activity.

60. William Barker reaches a similar conclusion, but partly on the basis of equity. See
Barker, supra note 30, at 162, 195-97.
61. See supra Pt. II. Other benefits of the use of multiple sovereign decision-makers in
global economic development include the release of information and action hidden from a
central decision-maker, competition among decision-makers, and improved decision-making
when unified global action is needed. Id.
62. See supra notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
63. See supra Pt. II, at notes 24-25.
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In terms of public finance, we ask government decision-makers
to be attentive to the design of their economic environments and to
avoid confiscatory measures to address their immediate problems.
Government decision-makers must see their economic environments
as assets to be cultivated. Cultivation of such an asset might consist of
building infrastructure, investing in human capital through health and
education, or leaving retained earnings within the economy to
become additional capital. Any of these measures would increase the
value of the economic environment and, from the government’s point
of view, increase its revenue stream from the asset.
Low-income nations usually have primitive infrastructure,
including their facilities for health and education. One route a lowincome nation might take is to set a low rate of tax to compensate for
the necessary private investment in substitute infrastructure. If the
selflessness of government decision-makers is in question, one might
prefer the infrastructure to be built by private enterprises and as it is
needed rather than by the government.
To preserve the value of multiple sovereign decision-makers, we
must address the temptation of autonomous decision-makers not to
bear the full market consequences of their decisions but to import
benefits from and export burdens to other national economic
environments. The three limitations on the design of national tax
codes address this temptation by defining the boundaries among
national spheres of autonomy in taxation. In doing so, the limitations
lay down rules for sovereign competition in taxation.
Two decisions that a sovereign decision-maker must make, and
for which we seek a variety of answers, are the size of a nation’s
public sector and the rate of capital formation within the nation’s
economic environment. The two decisions are interrelated. Thus, in
designing its income tax code, a nation must determine the trade-off
between private capital formation, on the one hand, and government
consumption and investment, on the other. In effect, a nation must
determine the size of its public sector both now and in the future. The
higher the tax rate on business income, the lower the rate of capital
formation by taxable enterprises can be. One factor a nation must
take into account in a decision to lower the tax rate on business
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income is the likely future tax revenue that additional capital would
64
generate.
This leads us to the first limitation. We must grant each nation
exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the income from business
operations conducted within its economic environment, if the nation
is to control the trade-off between current consumption and capital
formation. If other nations impose a tax burden on its business
operations, the additional burden will reduce the possible rate of
capital formation within its economic environment and the future
return on its foregone consumption. The uncertainty of its future
return would encourage a nation to abandon the global goal of capital
formation and take what tax revenue it can for current consumption.
The second limitation is also related to capital formation and the
size of a nation’s public sector. We must assure a nation that it will
retain prescriptive jurisdiction over the future returns on capital
formed within its economic environment. Thus, a nation should have
prescriptive jurisdiction over portfolio income arising from capital
accumulated within its economic environment, regardless of where
the capital is later invested. Moreover, such jurisdiction must be
exclusive. If it is not, the nation cannot determine, or rely on, the
compounding effect of capital formation within its economic
environment. The uncertainty of its compounded future return
encourages a nation to abandon the global goal of capital formation
in favor of current consumption.
Business income is the residual made possible in part by a
nation’s economic environment. Portfolio income is the return on
capital; capital is made possible by a government’s decision to forego
immediate taxation of all of the residual of a business operation. To
preserve incentives to the government in its cultivation of its
economic environment, we should leave the residual within the
government’s exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction and leave the
portfolio income there as well. Thus, the different treatment of
business income and portfolio income proposed here is the result of
preserving the same incentive to governments to cultivate their
economic environments.
The first limitation would also preserve the competitiveness of
other nations’ markets. To the extent that a corporate income tax is

64. For an illustration of the interplay between the size of a nation’s public sector, its public
debt, taxation, and its economic development, see What’s Holding India Back?, ECONOMIST,
Mar. 6, 2008, www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10808493.
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borne in part by customers, a supplementary income tax imposed by
one nation on activities conducted within another nation can reduce
competition within that other nation’s markets. The supplementary
income tax would affect the relative prices of otherwise competing
goods.
The third limitation requires transparency in the administration
of tax codes. Such transparency combats the use of one nation’s laws
by taxpayers of another nation to evade their own nation’s valid
taxes. Transparency in the administration of tax codes prevents the
imposition of externalities by financial tax havens on consumption
jurisdictions. Through their bank secrecy laws, financial tax havens
encourage the evasion of home nation taxation to their profit.
Transparency in the administration of tax codes requires that bank
secrecy laws be subordinate to the needs of tax administration.
65
The secrecy of tax information has several undesirable effects.
Such secrecy relieves the pressure from powerful individuals against
the enactment of confiscatory tax regimes; such individuals can
protect their income through non-transparent offshore investment
rather than moving to forestall the confiscatory taxation in the first
place. The effective exemption of such favored individuals from the
full brunt of a nation’s tax code opens the door to discriminatory
taxation of those without access to offshore investments.
Furthermore, the secrecy of tax information increases the
opportunities of corrupt administrators and advisors to extract rents
from the investors they serve. The secrecy of tax and banking
information is sometimes justified on the grounds that it prevents the
misuse of information by home governments, for example, to
discriminate against disfavored groups. This concern might be better
addressed through internal nondiscrimination law backed up by
international human rights norms. To ban the exchange of tax
information is an overly broad shield against discrimination.
These limitations serve the standard of democratic accountability
for the exercise of sovereign discretion. They ensure that a nation
only taxes the income of constituents, in the case of portfolio income,
or the income of business operations that employ constituents, in the
case of business income. Foreign investors have no formal role in a
nation’s legislative process. Furthermore, these limitations on the
design of national tax codes lead us to consider exemption systems for

65. See Roin, supra note 48, at 597-99.
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business income and worldwide systems for portfolio income. We
turn to those kinds of tax systems next.
(a) Exemption Systems for Business Income
These limitations on taxation suggest that nations should adopt
exemption systems for the taxation of international business income.66
Under an exemption system, a nation does not tax the income
generated by the foreign operations of its resident entities, whether
those operations are conducted as branches or subsidiaries.67 A nation
does tax the business income generated by a domestic business
operation, regardless of whether the operation is conducted by a
resident or a nonresident entity.68 The tax concept of a permanent
establishment can be used to define an entity’s business operations,
both foreign and domestic.69
The limitations on taxation suggest that a nation should not have
prescriptive jurisdiction over the income generated by its resident
entities’ foreign business operations. Such business income should
remain within the exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction of the foreign
nation. If such business income is distributed to the resident entity,
the dividends should be exempt from taxation by the nation of
residence; the underlying business income was within the prescriptive
jurisdiction of the foreign nation. Dividends are distributions of the
70
residual. Gain realized by the parent entity from the sale of stock in
66. Julie Roin would permit nations to impose a small tax on the income their resident
entities derive from their foreign operations in recognition of the services provided by a home
nation in the form of diplomatic protection and representation in international trade
negotiations. See id., at 586-90.
67. There are several variants of an exemption system in existence today. For a concise
account, see HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME TAXATION 372-77
(1997). Terrence Chorvat points out that a deferral system functions much like an exemption
system. See Terrence R. Chorvat, Ending the Taxation of Foreign Business Income, 42 ARIZ. L.
REV. 835, 843-44 (2000) (citing David Hartman, Tax Policy and Foreign Direct Investment, 26 J.
PUB. ECON. 187 (1985) and Hans Werner Sinn, Taxation and the Birth of Foreign Subsidiaries,
in TRADE WELFARE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES (Horst Herberg & Ngo Van Long eds., 1993)).
68. A tax on business income could be converted into a consumption tax. See Barker, supra
note 30, at 212-14. Michael Graetz believes that consumption taxes can be imposed “in a
manner quite similar to income taxes,” which may make GATT’s distinction between direct
taxes and indirect taxes meaningless. See Graetz, supra note 59, at 261, 298-99.
69. Business operations conducted on the high seas or in space may be difficult to allocate
to a specific nation’s economic environment. A multinational tax treaty could assist us here,
perhaps by allocating the income from such operations among the markets served. Until the
advent of a multinational tax treaty, such income might be treated under individual nations’
anti-abuse regimes. Anti-abuse regimes are discussed in part IV.A.1 infra.
70. If, under an anti-abuse regime, shareholders with a small holding are not taxed
currently by their jurisdiction of residence on their share of a controlled foreign corporation’s
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a foreign corporation should also be exempt from taxation by the
entity’s jurisdiction of residence. Such gain reflects the accumulation
of earnings exempt from taxation. Gain realized by a foreign branch
on the sale of assets producing exempt income should also be exempt
from taxation by the parent entity’s jurisdiction. Expenses allocable
to foreign business operations would not be deductible in the
jurisdiction of residence.71
Instead of distributing its residual, the foreign business operation
might accumulate and employ the residual in its future operations.
The nation of the parent entity’s residence should not have taxing
jurisdiction over the income generated by such capital accumulated
by a foreign operation of one of its resident entities; such income lies
within the exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction of the foreign nation.
Such income includes royalties from the licensing of intellectual
property developed by the foreign business operation, regardless of
the source of those royalties.
The limitations counsel against nations taxing the income
generated by the worldwide operations of their resident entities.
Existing worldwide systems of taxation should be replaced by
exemption systems.72 In particular, our goal of global economic
development suggests that the United States should substitute an
exemption system for its current worldwide system of business
income taxation.
In addition to promoting our goal of global economic
development, an exemption system avoids the pitfalls of worldwide
systems of taxation. Worldwide systems of taxation inhibit sovereign

diverted portfolio income, the portion of their dividends attributable to such income must be
taxable by their jurisdiction of residence. Anti-abuse regimes are discussed in part IV.A.1 infra.
71. Interest expense would have to be allocated on a worldwide basis. See Michael J.
Graetz & Paul W. Oosterhuis, Structuring an Exemption System for Foreign Income of U.S.
Corporations, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 771, 781 (2001).
72. John Steines points out that an exemption system has repercussions for a nation with a
classical system of two levels of tax on corporate income. If we were to exempt an individual’s
foreign business income from domestic taxation, we would also have to exempt distributions to
a shareholder from a domestic corporation made out of its exempt foreign business income. See
John P. Steines, Jr., Whether, When, and How to Tax the Profits of Controlled Foreign
Corporations, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1595, 1601-02 n.8 (2001). The solution may be to tax the net
amount of an individual’s foreign business income as portfolio income. This would, in effect,
impute a corporation between the foreign business income and the individual, exempt the
corporation’s foreign business income, and then treat the individual’s income as a distribution
from that corporation.
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competition in economic development.73 To make sovereign
competition effective in economic development, the standards
encourage private choice among national economic environments. To
promote such choice, business income must be taxed at the location
of the business operation. This permits private decision-makers to
choose among nations’ economic environments and to make the
choice on the basis of their individual business segments.74
In addition, worldwide systems of taxation depend on the
concept of an entity’s residence, which make the systems difficult to
administer. Entities can manipulate the criteria for determining their
residence. Such manipulation permits entities to choose among
nations for their place of residence on the basis of tax rates alone
rather than on the basis of economic environments. This results in
entities relocating their formal place of residence to headquarters tax
havens.75 Furthermore, establishing an entity’s residence on the basis
76
of the residence of its owners is impractical for publicly held entities.
(b) Worldwide Systems for Portfolio Income
The limitations on taxation suggest that nations should have
worldwide systems of taxation for the portfolio income of their
resident investors. Nations ought not to impose a tax on the portfolio
income of foreign investors.77 A national tax code should not offer a
foreign tax credit for portfolio income.78 If a business entity transfers
73. See C. GUSTAFSON ET AL., TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 19-20 (3d
ed., 2006) (describing worldwide tax systems with a foreign tax credit neutralizing effect of low
foreign tax rates).
74. The taxation of an entity’s business income solely on the basis of residence leads to the
odd result that a developing nation providing infrastructure to production facilities might not
collect any tax at all. To develop tax revenues from business operations under a residence-based
system, a developing nation would have to become a headquarters tax haven.
75. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 52, at 1573, 1593-97.
76. Robert Green has suggested the alternative of imputing a publicly held entity’s income
to its shareholders, which might avoid the need to determine the nationality of the entity. See
Robert A. Green, The Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational
Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18, 70-74 (1993). Such imputation may be particularly difficult
to administer. See id.at 72; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1313 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah,
Simplification].
77. Michael Graetz and Itai Grinberg would eliminate withholding taxes on foreign
portfolio income and push for multilateral arrangements for improving taxpayer compliance
with residence-based tax on portfolio income. Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing
International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 578-85 (2003).
78. Under the baseline established by the limitations on taxation, a foreign tax credit would
constitute a capital export subsidy. Furthermore, a foreign tax credit permits the nation of
importation to determine the amount of the subsidy (subject to market conditions and the terms
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capital to a foreign branch, the nation in which the capital was formed
may impute a return on such capital. An investor’s nation of
residence should have prescriptive jurisdiction over gain realized on
the investor’s disposition of an investment.
Worldwide systems for the taxation of portfolio income do not
inhibit sovereign competition to the degree that worldwide systems
for the taxation of business income do.79 The location of international
portfolio investment is primarily dependent on risk and return, rather
than on a nation’s economic environment. Sovereign competition in
shaping economic environments is unlikely to affect the location of
portfolio investment.
Furthermore, international capital markets make it difficult for a
nation to tax the portfolio income of foreign investors. Depending on
the global demand for debt capital, it may be difficult for a nation, as
a matter of market conditions, to tax the interest income of foreign
investors at all or to maintain the source-based taxation of portfolio
income generally. This inability to tax the interest income of foreign
investors has justified to some observers the residence-based taxation
of worldwide interest income, if not of all portfolio income, so that all
such income is in fact taxed.80

of tax treaties), which would make the economic decision-making of the capital exporting nation
indeterminate. Michael Graetz and Itai Grinberg would substitute a deduction for foreign taxes
for the foreign tax credit when it comes to foreign portfolio investment. Graetz & Grinberg,
supra note 77, at 568-75. Gary Hufbauer and Joanna van Rooij would condition any deduction
for foreign income taxes paid on the source country instituting a reporting system for dividends
to the residence country. See GARY C. HUFBAUER & JOANNA M. VAN ROOIJ, U.S. TAXATION
OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM 66-68 (1992). If the United States
adopted an exemption system for the taxation of business income but retained a credit system
for portfolio income, its foreign tax credit could be simplified. Because foreign nations typically
tax foreign investors’ business income more heavily than their portfolio income, only lightly
taxed income of U.S. investors would remain for crediting. Hence, the United States would be
able to reduce the number of baskets necessary for the proper operation of a foreign tax credit
limitation. See Steines, supra note 72, at 1605.
79. Residence-based taxation of the portfolio income of individuals may also be justified
on the basis of equity, or redistributive possibilities. See Avi-Yonah, Simplification, supra note
76, at 1316, 1336. The redistribution of wealth can be based on economic considerations, as well
as equity: redistribution may affect the rate of economic development.
80. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 52, at 1579-86, 1667-70. Forms of capital
other than debt capital – equity, real property, tangible personal property, and intangible
property – have different degrees of mobility than debt capital. (Intangibles are highly mobile in
the sense that they can be withdrawn easily from a jurisdiction at the end of the licensing term.
Their consumption is non-rivalrous, however, so higher returns elsewhere do not necessarily
mean the intangibles would be withdrawn from a jurisdiction yielding a lower return.) It is more
feasible for source jurisdictions to tax the returns from those forms of capital than the returns on
debt capital.
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Recall that the standards for the exercise of sovereign discretion
require national income tax codes to conform to norms of tax
81
neutrality. We would achieve true capital export neutrality, or
neutrality in the worldwide allocation of the supply of capital, if each
nation had exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the portfolio
income of its resident investors.82 Each investor would be subject to
uniform worldwide taxation of its portfolio income, because such
income would be taxable by only one nation and by that nation no
matter where the investor puts the capital to use.83 True capital export
neutrality allocates capital to the uses with the highest pre-tax riskadjusted returns, all other things (including economic environments)
being equal.
Worldwide systems for the taxation of portfolio income still
retain the problems of the manipulation by taxpayers of the criteria
for residence and the failure by taxpayers to report their foreign
portfolio income. These remaining problems are taken up later in this
Article when it turns to problems of collective action.
3.Distinguishing Between Business Income and Portfolio Income
The distinction between business income and portfolio income is
mainly one of the decision-making authority of the taxpayer. The
taxpayer derives business income when it has direct control over the
activities that create the cash flow that can be distributed to those
84
making investments in the enterprise. Portfolio income is the

81. See supra Pt. III.B.3.
82. See Barker, supra note 30, at 195. Capital export neutrality is discussed in part III.D.1
infra.
83. The case of individual investors is more complicated, but its analysis reaches the same
conclusion. Affluent individuals must decide how much of their after-tax income to save and
how much to consume. This decision, and by extension, the supply of savings, is affected by the
rate of return on savings. The policy of capital import neutrality would address this prior
decision by affluent individual investors and is said to maximize world savings. Once affluent
individuals have determined the amount of their savings, they then must decide upon the
allocation of those savings among possible investments. The policy of capital export neutrality
addresses this second decision. When these two policies conflict, Thomas Horst argues that the
policy of capital export neutrality should be our choice because the demand for capital is more
elastic than the supply of capital with regard to the rate of return. See Barker, supra note 30, at
191 (citing Thomas Horst, A Note on the Optimal Taxation of International Investment Income,
94 Q.J. ECON. 793, 793-96 (1980)). Barker believes that the policy of capital import neutrality
does not in fact have an effect on the individual investor’s decision to save or consume after-tax
income, which would eliminate the policy as an alternative. See id. at 191-92.
84. Roger Gordon and Joosung Jun draw a similar distinction between portfolio financing
and parent equity financing for a foreign operation. Parent equity financing (which, in my
terminology, generates business income) allows joint control and operation in the home and
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distributed cash flow received by those investors. Business income is
not a return on a factor of production; it is the residual or created
85
value of the business operation.
Portfolio investors have only indirect control over the activities
that create the cash flow out of which they are to be paid. Although
an investor may restrict an enterprise’s discretion through contractual
covenants, nevertheless the investor must be satisfied with acting
indirectly through the enterprise’s decision-makers, bearing a layer of
86
agency costs not borne by the enterprise.
The difference in the decision-making authority of the taxpayer
leads to a difference in the manner in which investments are selected.
The location of international direct investment exploits the investor’s
proprietary know-how or its economies of scale or scope. The
location of international portfolio investment, on the other hand, is
primarily dependent on risk and return.87
To foster global economic development, nations must focus on
the decision-making authority of those with direct control of the
activities that create the cash flow out of which investment returns,
employee compensation, and taxes are paid. We would expect nations
to shape their economic environments to influence those decisionmakers. The taxation of business income is an important component
of a nation’s economic environment.

host nations, but portfolio financing affects only the ownership of the foreign operation’s
income. Roger Gordon & Joosung Jun, Taxes and the Form of Ownership of Foreign Corporate
Equity, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 13 (A. Giovannini et al., eds., 1993).
85. See Barker, supra note 30, at 195. Michael Devereux and Glenn Hubbard refer to this
residual as economic rent, that is, a return in excess of a firm’s cost of capital. The firm’s
intangibles, company-specific cost advantages, and economies of scale associated with its
headquarter activities can be the source of such returns. See Michael P. Devereux & R. Glenn
Hubbard, Taxing Multinationals (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7920,
2000); R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax Policy and International Competitiveness, 82 TAXES 213, 218
(Mar. 2004) (treating economic rent as distinguishing foreign direct investment from portfolio
investment).
86. Companies derive either business income or portfolio income from their working
capital, depending whether such capital is employed in the business or is temporarily idle. For
ease of administration and compliance, we might want to categorize the income from working
capital as business income for tax purposes, subject to a limitation on the amount of the entity’s
working capital. Michael Graetz and Paul Oosterhuis would use a de minimis rule based on
gross income or total assets. See Graetz & Oosterhuis, supra note 71, at 775.
87. Foreign direct investment is said to complement domestic investment, as enterprises
expand to exploit economies of scale or scope or to exploit their proprietary know-how. See
Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 77, at 549 & nn.50-51. In contrast, foreign portfolio investment is
said to substitute for domestic investment, with its location primarily dependent on risk and
return. Id. at 549 & nn.54-55.
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4. The Special Case of Intangibles.
Intellectual property, or intangibles, presents a special case for
three reasons. First, the consumption of intangibles is non-rivalrous;
the use of an intangible in a foreign jurisdiction doesn’t necessarily
prevent its use in the home jurisdiction. For that reason, the policy of
locational or capital export neutrality isn’t a consideration in the
taxation of royalties from intangibles. The owner of intangibles isn’t
faced with the question of choosing among national economic
environments for the allocation of its capital.
Second, a multinational enterprise frequently exploits its
intangibles entirely in-house, without licensing the intangibles to
outsiders. Transaction cost economics suggests that the companies
that engage in foreign direct investment are technically innovative
and cannot safeguard their intangibles through long-term contracts.88
To exploit their intangibles, such companies must own the foreign
operations that make use of their intangibles. Those companies derive
imputed royalty income, rather than arms-length royalty income.
Intangibles present a special case in a third sense. National
governments frequently permit taxpayers to expense the costs of
developing intangibles when those costs ordinarily would be
capitalized. Governments subsidize the development of intangibles
through this tax expenditure and arguably are entitled to receive the
deferred tax revenue from the intangible’s income stream as a result.
Note that the expense incurred by the taxpayer in developing an
intangible reflects the intangible’s potential global return. The
government that subsidized the development of the intangible for
global use thus is arguably entitled to include the intangible’s global
royalties in its tax base. Conversely, a government should not tax the
royalties from intangibles developed abroad. Such taxation arguably
would be discriminatory, because the government did not subsidize
the development of those intangibles.89 We could view government
subsidization of the development of intangibles partly as a public
investment in a nation’s economic environment and partly as an
investment in the government’s future stream of tax revenue.
This Article’s treatment of portfolio income is consistent with
this view of intangibles. Under that treatment, the worldwide returns
on intangibles are properly taxable by the nation in which the
intangibles were developed (and possibly subsidized). Royalties

88. See WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 290-94, 296.
89. See Barker, supra note 30, at 208-09.
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would be deductible in the nation where the intellectual property is
used and would not be subject to a withholding tax.
5. The Returns on Foreign Direct Investment
The limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction over the global
income tax base have repercussions for the taxation of the returns on
foreign direct investment. Recall that the limitations leave business
income with the nation in which the underlying business operation is
located. Such business income is the residual after the returns on
capital have been paid and reflects in part the contribution made by a
nation’s economic environment. Because of the value to global
economic development of sovereign competition and the other
benefits of using multiple sovereigns, this residual should be exempt
from further taxation when it is distributed to a parent corporation.
Hence, the parent corporation would be entitled to a deduction for
intercorporate dividends.90
Interest, rent, and royalties paid to a parent corporation would
be deductible in the nation of source and taxable in the nation in
which the underlying capital was accumulated, the same treatment
these returns would receive when they are paid to unrelated persons.
The nation of source ought not to impose a withholding tax on
payments of dividends, interest, rent, or royalties. The limitations
permit the nation of source to tax the underlying income out of which
dividends are paid, while reserving the other items to the nation in
which the underlying capital was accumulated. National tax codes
would be entitled to impute a return on assets, intangibles, and
borrowed funds made available by a resident entity to a foreign
branch.
The limitations on prescriptive jurisdiction over the global
income tax base do not relieve the pressure on national tax
administrators to distinguish between true dividends and disguised
interest, rent, or royalties or to distinguish between true interest, rent,
or royalties and disguised dividends. National tax codes would need
to police income-shifting and income-extracting techniques through
anti-abuse rules. National tax codes would also have to police the use
of corporations by individuals as passive investment vehicles.

90. Dividends paid to holders of small shareholdings would be subject to taxation if such
shareholders’ nation of residence employs a classical system of coordination between corporate
and shareholder income taxes.
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6. Preferential Tax Regimes and Illicit Tax Competition.
Preferential tax regimes are an illicit form of sovereign
competition. Preferential tax regimes offer tax rates to new business
operations owned by non-residents that are lower than the tax rates
in force for business operations owned by residents. Pressure from
internal interest groups frequently requires a preferential tax regime
to be ring-fenced: the beneficiary cannot deal in the sovereign’s
internal market but must export its products or services. Ring-fenced
preferential regimes subsidize exports and thus violate this Article’s
limitation prohibiting export subsidies.91 Preferential tax regimes that
are not ring-fenced may affect the relative prices of goods and
services within a sovereign’s economic environment and thus violate

91. Preferential tax regimes that subsidize exports of goods violate GATT. See Joel
Slemrod & Reuven Avi-Yonah, (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues?,
55 TAX L. REV. 533, 550 (2002) (referring to production tax havens); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
Treating Tax Issues Through Trade Regimes, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1683, 1686-87 (2001)
[hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Treating]. The OECD report suggests that ring-fenced tax incentive
regimes are detrimental to global economic growth; such regimes are said to fall outside the
“standard tax-revenue paradigm.” See Engel, supra note 59, at 1577, n.279. Another export
subsidy may lie within a nation’s source rules if the nation uses a foreign tax credit system. For
example, the United States uses a set fifty-fifty division between manufacturing and sales
income for products manufactured domestically and then exported from the United States; the
United States then characterizes the sales income as foreign source. See Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3(b)
(as amended in 1998). The sales income is not taxed by the country of importation if the
taxpayer has no permanent establishment in that country, but is eligible for cross-crediting of
foreign income taxes for purposes of the U.S. foreign tax credit. The result for U.S.-based
multinational enterprises with operations in high-tax jurisdictions is that fifty percent of U.S.
export income is not taxed by anyone. See CHARLES I. KINGSON, INTERNATIONAL TAXATION
49-60 (1998); Claire Kelly et al., Panel Transcript IV, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1711, 1716 (2001)
(remarks by Charles I. Kingson). To the extent that export income is not taxed by anyone, it
benefits from an export subsidy in violation of GATT. Reuven Avi-Yonah sees possible export
subsidies in the tax regimes of traditional tax havens and headquarters tax havens. See AviYonah, Treating, supra note 91, at 1687-88. I disagree, although such tax havens may run afoul
of other standards and limitations presented by this Article. Traditional tax havens have no
income tax for either residents or foreign investors. Even if such tax havens prohibit foreign
investors from providing financial services to residents, such ring-fencing is not an export
subsidy. Instead, such ring-fencing is a form of market segmentation, which raises prices to
residents in their purchases of services. It may also violate the national treatment standard for
services under the General Agreement on Trade in Services. Headquarters tax havens do have
an income tax, but do not tax the income derived by a resident company from its foreign
subsidiaries. As long as those exemption systems are properly structured (that is, so as not to
exclude export income from domestic operations but only to exclude income attributable to
foreign permanent establishments), the systems should pass muster under GATT and under the
standards and limitations developed in this Article. Avi-Yonah would find an export subsidy
when an exemption system excluded foreign source income that was not taxed by the source
country. Id. at 1688.
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this Article’s standard requiring neutrality in tax legislation.92
Accordingly, preferential tax regimes exceed the institutional
93
competence of a nation. To attract branches and subsidiaries of nonresidents without abusing its sovereign discretion, a nation must lower
94
its tax rate for all business operations, regardless of ownership. We
might refer to this conclusion as the tax norm of national treatment
for foreign-owned business activity: business activity owned by
foreign investors should be treated no better and no worse than
business activity owned by domestic investors.
D. Evaluation of Two Traditional Policies
Analysts traditionally have used the policies of capital export
neutrality and capital import neutrality to evaluate rules of
international taxation.95 Neither policy fully takes into account the
institutional competence of nations in global economic development.
If we subordinate these two traditional policies to our goal of global
economic development and take institutional competence into
account, we can eliminate capital import neutrality from
consideration and confine the application of capital export neutrality
to capital income only.

92. The standards for legislation are discussed in part III.B.3 supra. The effects of a
preferential tax regime on the sponsoring nation include a possible increase in imports of goods
and services (which balances the inflow of capital and is caused by capital inflows increasing the
value of the local currency) and a possible decrease in exports of goods and services produced
by existing, locally owned businesses. Requiring the foreign-owned business to be conducted in
a foreign currency may shield the sponsoring nation from some of the externalities. See Barker,
supra note 30, at 178. Labor costs for locally owned businesses might increase, depending on
initial unemployment and the role of exports in the local economy.
93. Reuven Avi-Yonah sees preferential tax regimes as a form of tax competition that does
not reflect voter choice about the size of a nation’s government. Preferential tax regimes are
frequently created by administrative action without voter approval. See Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, supra note 52, at 1627-28. Preferential tax regimes may also be unjustified on the
basis of cost-benefit analysis. See id. at 1628. He would therefore distinguish preferential tax
regimes from regimes with universally low rates. Id. at 1627-28. Preferential tax regimes may be
the result of a collective action problem; because of competition, no nation feels that it can
dispense with them when bidding for new foreign investment. See id. at 1645-46.
94. Julie Roin would permit a small differential between the tax rates for domestic
taxpayers and for foreign taxpayers to reflect the costs incurred by the government in extending
representation in international trade matters and diplomatic protection to domestic taxpayers
under international law. See Roin, supra note 48, at 590-92. To avoid creating an incentive for
domestic companies to expatriate, Roin would maintain identical tax rates for foreign and
domestic corporations, and transfer the differential to the taxation of domestic shareholders. See
id. at 591-92.
95. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 73, at 17-18.
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1. Capital Export Neutrality
The policy of capital export neutrality asks a sovereign to
consider the combination of the nation’s tax code with those of other
nations and to design the domestic code in such a way as to remove
aggregate taxation as a consideration in a resident enterprise’s choice
of location for a business operation.96 The policy is usually
implemented by the adoption of a tax code that taxes a nation’s
residents on the income from their worldwide operations, with a
credit for foreign income taxes they have paid on their foreign income
up to the amount of domestic tax owed on that foreign income. In
effect, a nation tops off the foreign income tax on its residents’
income from foreign operations to bring the aggregate tax burden up
97
to the level borne by the income from domestic operations.
The policy of capital export neutrality is inconsistent with this
Article’s first limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over the
98
global tax base. The first limitation provides that a nation may not
exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over the income arising from
business operations conducted within the territory of another nation;
a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over the income arising from
business operations conducted within its own territory is to be
exclusive. Under the first limitation, a nation may not impose a
topping off tax on the income arising from its residents’ business
operations conducted in other nations.
Capital export neutrality is, however, consistent in result with
this Article’s second limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction.
The second limitation provides that a nation has exclusive
prescriptive jurisdiction over the worldwide portfolio income of its
residents; a nation may not exercise prescriptive jurisdiction over any
of the portfolio income of another nation’s residents. The second
limitation provides the locational neutrality that serves as the
motivation for the policy of capital export neutrality, but for portfolio
investment only.

96. Id.
97. In practice, the policy of capital export neutrality is not implemented fully. For
example, a resident enterprise may elect to eliminate the domestic tax by incorporating its
foreign operations as foreign subsidiaries and repatriating only those earnings for which it has
sufficient foreign tax credits to eliminate the domestic tax.
98. See supra Part III.C.2 for the three limitations on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction
suggested by this Article.
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The policy of capital export neutrality is usually justified on the
99
Giving nations exclusive
grounds of allocative efficiency.
prescriptive jurisdiction over the income arising from business
operations conducted within their own territory is said to be
inefficient, in the sense of skewing decisions about the location for
business operations. Enterprises should not choose the location for
new business operations on the basis of low tax rates, so the policy
argues, but instead on the basis of non-tax factors.100 The policy would
neutralize not only the attraction of a foreign nation’s lower tax rate,
but would neutralize the difference between two foreign nations’
lower tax rates.
The justification for the policy is incomplete. It fails to take into
account the difference between allocative efficiency and adaptive
efficiency. Allocative efficiency addresses the maximum output
possible for an economy, given a particular institutional arrangement
101
Allocative
(including the initial distribution of endowments).
efficiency ties together a particular institutional arrangement and a
particular maximum output, as it were. The maximum output possible
with one institutional arrangement of an economy may well differ
from the maximum output that is possible with another institutional
arrangement for that economy. This raises the question of
determining and selecting the institutional arrangement that produces
the greatest maximum output for an economy. Adaptive efficiency
addresses the changes in an economy’s institutional arrangement that
permit the economy to achieve a higher maximum output. Adaptive
efficiency helps a society over time to grow economic output larger

99. For a survey of limitations of the economic analysis supporting the policy of capital
export neutrality, see Graetz, supra note 59, at 284-93. Reuven Avi-Yonah has a helpful account
of commentary by economists on capital export neutrality, Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra
note 52, at 1604-11, as well as welfare economics and public choice, id. at 1611-16.
100. Even within a single national economic environment, locational neutrality might not be
the optimal policy. As Daniel Shaviro has said, “The argument for locationally neutral taxation .
. . is . . . that absent differences on the service side taxes should be neutral and minimize
behavioral responses.” Shaviro, supra note 58, at 909. Locational neutrality fails to take into
account the “differences on the services side.” See Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local
Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (advancing the thesis that free movement of persons
between cities with different levels of taxes and services will maximize the satisfaction of
preferences). In addition to differences in services, there may be differences in institutional
environment.
101. See NORTH, supra note 2, at 28 (“with positive transaction costs, resource allocations
are altered by property rights structures”); Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1960).
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than the maximum produced by allocative efficiency at any given
102
time.
We cannot determine the best institutional arrangement a priori,
in part because of the cognitive limitations of decision-makers
(including the withholding of information by others). Instead, we
must allow societies to develop different institutional arrangements
103
and evaluate them by comparison. The policy of capital export
neutrality fails to take into account this necessity of having multiple
and autonomous decision-makers, the different economic
environments offered by nations, and the role of competition in
limiting abuses of sovereign discretion.
When applied to foreign business operations, the policy of capital
export neutrality imposes a negative externality on nations by
distorting the effect of their decisions about tax rates and capital
formation and imposing an additional tax burden on their economies.
If one nation imposes a topping off tax on the income generated by a
resident’s business operation located in a second nation, the effective
tax rate in the second nation on business income will be higher, the

102. See NORTH, supra note 2, at 80-82; Pavel Pelikan, The Formation of Incentive Systems
in Different Economic Systems, in INCENTIVES AND ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 27, 31-33 (Stephan
Hedlund ed., 1987) (comparing organizational processes to allocative processes). Oliver
Williamson refers to allocative efficiency as a form of second-order economizing. See
WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 2, at 94 (“Marginal analysis is typically concerned with
second-order refinements to the neglect of first-order economizing.”). Second-order
economizing is subordinate to first-order economizing, which deals with the efficiency of
organizations and institutional environments. See id. at 100 (“[e]conomics was too preoccupied
with issues of allocative efficiency, in which marginal analysis was featured, to the neglect of
organizational efficiency, in which discrete structural alternatives were brought under
scrutiny.”), 309-11. The relationship between international law and domestic law runs into an
analogous problem. Efficient domestic rules may come at the expense of efficient rules about
prescriptive jurisdiction. See Trachtman, supra note 28, at 30. In a similar vein, Joel Trachtman
asserts that “conflicts efficiency may override substantive efficiency, just as conflicts justice may
override substantive justice . . . . The question of what law to apply becomes a fundamental
question of justice among overlapping communities and overlapping substantive goals.” Id. at 42
(citing Gerhard Kegel, Fundamental Approaches, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
COMPARATIVE LAW, ch. 3, at 4-5 (Kurt Lipstein ed., 1987)). Nancy Kaufman points out the
need to separate the concerns of international law from those of domestic law in the analysis of
fairness in taxation. Fairness within a national tax code deals with the distribution among a
population of the burden of a nation’s revenue needs. Fairness as a criterion of international
taxation is a characteristic of the allocation among nations of the competence to tax. Nancy H.
Kaufman, Fairness and the Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 145,
155-56, 202 (1998). In contrast, Cliff Fleming, Bob Peroni, and Steve Shay would apply the same
concept of fairness – interpersonal equity – at both the national and international levels. J.
Clifton Fleming, Jr. et al., Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing
Worldwide Income, 5 FLA. TAX REV. 299 (2001).
103. See supra Pt. II.
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possible rate of capital formation lower, and the level of future tax
revenue lower than the second nation had determined. The second
nation is left with the unsatisfactory alternative of raising its tax rate
and, via the mechanism of the first nation’s foreign tax credit,
regaining the tax revenue burdening its economy.
The justification for the policy of capital export neutrality is
incomplete in a second sense. The policy views foreign direct
investment as a transfer of net savings between nations and thus a
substitute for domestic business investment. The policy fails to
consider foreign direct investment that extends a resident enterprise’s
application of proprietary intangibles to take advantage of economies
of scale and scope and thus serves as a complement to domestic
104
business investment. More specifically, the justification fails to take
into account the economic benefits of transferring the ownership of
existing business assets to new owners who can use the assets more
productively.105
In contrast, foreign portfolio investment is a transfer of net
savings and thus a better candidate than foreign direct investment for
the application of the policy of capital export neutrality. Decisions
about the location of foreign portfolio investment are driven by riskadjusted return and not by the differences among national economic
environments. This Article does not, however, adopt the
underpinnings of the policy. Instead, this Article’s second limitation
on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction is based on the need for capital
formation and the concomitant need to assure national decisionmakers that capital formed through lower tax rates will generate
income within the nation’s future tax base. The second limitation
addresses the incentives facing national decision-makers.
At times, the policy of capital export neutrality serves as a
rationalization of self-interest. The policy inhibits competition among
sovereigns in the creation of national economic environments, a key
measure to contain the agency costs of the delegation of decision104. See Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56 NAT’L
TAX J. 487, 488-91 (2003). Institutional economics explains why a resident enterprise cannot
simply exploit its proprietary intangibles through contracts with independent local enterprises in
the foreign market. Contracts cannot give the resident enterprise the necessary control over its
intangibles; common ownership of the foreign enterprise and the resident enterprise is required
for such control. Multinational enterprises exist in part to exploit proprietary intangibles that
cannot be protected under contracts with independent third parties. See WILLIAMSON,
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 290-94.
105. See Desai & Hines, supra note 94, at 494-96. Mihir Desai and James Hines elaborate on
this insight by proposing the international tax policy of capital ownership neutrality. See id.
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making authority to sovereigns by the world’s people. The policy
serves the self-interest of a nation’s public decision-makers by
limiting competition in taxation and any short-term reduction in a
nation’s tax revenues. In addition, domestic interest groups may view
the policy as a way to segment global markets along national lines. In
that sense, the policy of capital export neutrality serves protectionist
ends. The policy is a blunt instrument for addressing the costs of
transition to higher standards of living by means of the international
movement of business operations. The policy addresses those
transition costs by attempting to prevent the movement in the first
place, rather than by evaluating the distribution of the benefits from
freer trade.106
2. Capital Import Neutrality
The other traditional policy for the evaluation of international
tax rules is capital import neutrality, or private competitiveness.
Capital import neutrality asks a sovereign to recognize a right of each
of its resident enterprises to compete in foreign markets under the
same aggregate tax burden as its foreign competitors.107 A nation
usually implements the policy through the adoption of an exemption
system for the taxation of income derived from its residents’ foreign
operations. Income derived from a resident’s foreign operation is
exempt from taxation, regardless of whether the operation is
conducted as a branch or through a foreign subsidiary. The resident’s
income from its foreign operation bears only the tax imposed by the
foreign nation. In contrast, income derived by a resident from a
domestic business operation, whether the income is of foreign source
or domestic source, is taxed by the resident’s nation.
The policy of capital import neutrality coincides in result with
this Article’s first limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction
over the global tax base. The first limitation provides that a nation
may not tax the income arising from business operations conducted
within the territory of another nation; each nation is to have exclusive
prescriptive jurisdiction over income derived from operations
conducted within its territory. The basis for the first limitation,
however, is not a concern for the foreign competitiveness of national
champions, but rather a concern for global economic development.
106. Targeted assistance programs may be less expensive in the long run than restrictions on
trade. For a discussion, see Alan O. Sykes, Countervailing Duty Law: An Economic Perspective,
89 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 211-13 (1989).
107. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 73, at 18.
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The policy of capital import neutrality is not consistent with this
Article’s second limitation on a nation’s prescriptive jurisdiction over
the global income tax base. The second limitation provides that a
nation is to have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the
worldwide portfolio income of its residents. Because different nations
may well impose different rates of tax on the portfolio income of their
residents, income derived by foreign investors from portfolio
investment in a single nation may be subject to different rates of tax.
Thus, a portfolio investor would not invest in a foreign nation under
the same tax burden as competing investors.
There are two traditional justifications for the policy of capital
import neutrality. Neither takes into account the institutional
competence of nations in global economic development. The first
seeks efficiency in the allocation of a foreign market’s demand for
capital. This justification has been discredited. The justification
wrongly assumed that the elasticity of the supply of capital was
greater than the elasticity of the demand for capital in response to
changes in taxation.108 The justification also required that each nation
tax the income derived by foreign portfolio investors in the same
109
manner as it taxed the income of domestic portfolio investors. The
international mobility of capital, however, prevents most nations from
110
adopting this approach.
The second traditional justification for the policy appeals to the
fairness of treatment of a resident enterprise and its competitors in
foreign markets. The topping off tax imposed by a nation with a
worldwide tax system, so the argument goes, places an additional
burden on its enterprises as they compete in a foreign marketplace
against enterprises subject to no such additional tax.

108. See Barker, supra note 30, at 191-92.
109. See id. at 193.
110. Competitive conditions in capital markets may prevent a nation from taxing the
interest income of foreign investors at all or from maintaining the source-based taxation of
portfolio income generally. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 52, at 1579-86.
Furthermore, in a small, open economy, the burden of a withholding tax on interest income
would not fall on the foreign lender’s shareholders. Instead, the burden would be passed on to
the domestic borrower who must then do two things: reduce its demand for borrowings and
reduce its fixed domestic costs, for example, its wage bill. This is the basis for the
recommendation that small, open economies not tax investment income, but tax labor directly
(which is more efficient than taxing labor indirectly through the withholding tax on investment
income). See Roger H. Gordon & James R. Hines Jr., International Taxation, 4-5 (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8854, 2002).
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The justification based on fairness attracts two kinds of criticism.
The first kind is based on the incidence of a corporate income tax.
Capital import neutrality assumes that the incidence of a domestic
corporate income tax falls on consumers in the foreign market and
thus affects the competitive position of the enterprise in the foreign
market.111 Traditionally, however, the incidence of a corporate income
tax was thought to fall on the corporation’s shareholders. Proponents
of capital export neutrality used this traditional understanding to
criticize the policy of capital import neutrality on two grounds. First, a
topping-off tax by the corporation’s home nation would only affect its
shareholders’ return on their investment, reducing the corporation’s
capitalization in a one-time event but not otherwise affecting the
corporation’s competitive position.112 The corporation pays the
topping-off tax only when it is profitable; its break-even point should
not be affected by a corporate income tax. Second, the corporation’s
foreign competitors would have no incentive to lower prices in the
foreign marketplace, because such a strategy would only lower their
own profit margin.113
More recent scholarship suggests that shareholders share the
114
burden of a corporate income tax with consumers and workers. This
conclusion suggests that a topping-off tax may in fact reduce
competition in the foreign market place, to the detriment of
consumer welfare.115 Furthermore, GATT decisions that characterize
targeted income tax subsidies as export subsidies also assume that a

111. See PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT
INCOME 119 (1969).
112. See JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 144 (5th ed. 1987).
113. This argument is an extension of the argument that the policy of taxing nonprofit
organizations on their unrelated business income is misconceived. For the latter argument, see
Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34 STAN. L. REV.
1017 (1982); Richard Steinberg, “Unfair” Competition by Nonprofits and Tax Policy, 44 NAT’L
TAX J. 351 (1991). The extension of the argument fails to take into account a for-profit
organization’s reduction in its own profit margin as a strategy to gain market share.
114. See PECHMAN, supra note 112, at 141-46. In a closed economy, the burden of a
corporate income tax falls primarily on capital owners. However, in a small, open economy, the
burden of a withholding tax on interest income does not fall on the lender’s shareholders.
Instead, the burden is passed on to the borrower who must then do two things: reduce its
demand for borrowings and reduce its fixed domestic costs, for example, its wage bill. This is the
basis for the recommendation that small, open economies not tax investment income, but tax
labor directly (which is more efficient than taxing labor indirectly through the withholding tax
on investment income). See Gordon & Hines, supra note 110, at 4-5.
115. One effect of a topping off tax could be a reduced variety of goods available to the
global market. See Joel B. Slemrod, Free Trade Taxation and Protectionist Taxation, 2 INT’L
TAX & PUB. FIN. 471, 483 (1995) (referring to such a reduction as an efficiency cost).
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corporate income tax of a home nation affects the workings of foreign
markets and not simply the return enjoyed by the shareholders of an
enterprise. GATT outlaws export subsidies because they skew
competition within the market of importation.116
The justification based on fairness attracts a second kind of
criticism. This criticism targets the justification’s over-inclusiveness.
Consider the income arising from the domestic operations of resident
enterprises. Taken to its logical conclusion and without regard to the
institutional competence of nations, a policy of fairness for national
champions requires that the income arising from a domestic
operation’s export sales be excluded from domestic taxation if foreign
competitors conduct their operations within an economic
environment less burdensome than the domestic economic
environment.117 The thrust of the policy is to neutralize some element
in the domestic economic environment so as to eliminate that element
as a competitive factor in the resident enterprise’s global industry. In
this instance, capital import neutrality would be a form of illicit
competition by a sovereign. The elimination of a valid element in the
domestic economic environment for the benefit of exporters of goods
or services but not for anyone else in the domestic constituency is a
form of export subsidy, i.e., a form of discrimination that impairs
global economic development. The policy of capital import neutrality
simply becomes a rationalization of the self-interest of national
champions in avoiding elements of the national economic
environment in which they conduct their operations.
The institutional competence of nations provides a better
foundation for exemption systems of taxation for foreign business
operations. Global welfare benefits from multiple sovereigns,
different national economic environments, and sovereign
competition. Exemption systems improve competition in a host
nation’s markets and respect the host nation’s decisions about capital

116. Paul McDaniel identifies three negative effects of export subsidies, including those
distributed through tax subsidies: the skewing of sales away from third-country producers who
have a comparative advantage over the subsidized producers, the missed opportunity by the
subsidized producers to achieve new efficiencies, and possible retaliation by third countries
through competing subsidies. See McDaniel, Trade Agreements, supra note 56, at 295. Export
subsidies may also increase the value of the subsidizing nation’s currency, reducing the benefit
of the subsidy without reducing its cost to the nation’s taxpayers. See id. at 296.
117. As yet, no one has argued that the domestic sales income of a resident enterprise
should be exempt from domestic taxation if its products or services compete with imports. The
protectionist impulse is expressed through countervailing duties, antidumping duties, or
safeguard measures.
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formation by all enterprises active in its economic environment.118 The
institutional competence of nations in global economic development
limits the use of the policy of capital import neutrality to business
operations. Furthermore, it limits the policy to the income derived by
a resident enterprise from a foreign operation and thus limits the
overly broad nature of the policy’s justification based on fairness.
IV. COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEMS
Nations face problems in collective action as they shape their
economic environments. A collective action problem leads a nation to
choose an inferior state of affairs because it cannot rely on other
nations to make the choices necessary for all to achieve a superior
state of affairs. In a collective action problem, the parties’ self-interest
is insufficient to coordinate their choices and achieve the optimum
result. We are concerned with those collective action problems that
prevent nations from achieving strong economic development and
cause them to settle for less.
A. Social Norms as the Solution
We solve collective action problems by changing the
consequences of the alternatives faced by decision-makers and by
119
that means coordinating their decision-making. Although there are
several ways to change the consequences of a sovereign decisionmaker’s alternatives, the use of social norms must be the primary
method.120

118. A worldwide system of taxation for business income serves as a unilateral projection of
a nation’s conception of economic development onto the world. See Brown, supra note 59, at
313-14 (discussing the OECD’s lack of attention to the needs of developing nations and
referring to “the hegemony of the principle of capital export neutrality”).
119. For an elaboration of this point, see DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 31-35 (1994).
120. I define the term “social norm” broadly to include behavioral regularities that
maximize value for actors in cooperative relationships. I differ from Eric Posner, who
sometimes limits the denotation of the term to behavioral regularities that signal an actor’s
trustworthiness in cooperative relationships and departures from which cause the actor to be
shunned by others. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS 34 (2000) (distinguishing
social norms from “behavioral regularities that emerge in cooperative relationships simply
because they are value maximizing”). I agree with Posner that any behavioral regularity that
arises from incomplete information is a social norm. See id. at 41. An actor might continue its
cooperative behavior in the face of incomplete information about its payoff in a particular
round of an indefinitely repeated game in the belief that cooperation maximizes the actor’s
payoffs through all rounds of play.
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In general, there are five ways to coordinate decision-making
about economic development: markets; longer-term relationships
achieved through bargaining; voting that is binding on dissenters;
hierarchy, i.e., the grant of asymmetric and incompletely defined
authority to one decision-maker to direct the decision-making of
another; and social norms.121 The first four ways are of limited use for
the coordination of sovereign decision-making.
We have already mentioned competition among sovereigns as a
means of limiting the abuse of sovereign discretion. The market in
sovereigns, if you will, suffers from almost prohibitive transaction
costs; individuals are unable to move easily among sovereigns. The
resulting segmentation of the market impairs its ability to coordinate
sovereign decision-making. Furthermore, markets are of limited use
under conditions of asymmetric information and interdependent
work. Under those conditions, markets must be supplemented by
shared knowledge and cooperation. Those supplements can be
created through hierarchy and social norms.122
Bargaining to create a longer-term relationship between
decision-makers is a second method of coordinating decision-making.
Nations enter into treaties to stabilize their expectations of each
other’s behavior. Bargains, however, require hierarchy for their
enforcement when the norms they contain are not self-enforcing.
Furthermore, bargaining can be inefficient in the face of asymmetric
information and stalemate over the division of the efficiency bonus.
There are no incentive schemes to which parties will agree voluntarily
123
that will cause parties to disclose their payoffs. Those incentive
schemes must be imposed through hierarchy and social norms.
Voting that is binding on dissenters is a third method of
coordinating decision-making. Such voting is generally unavailable in
a world of sovereign decision-makers, although binding voting
mechanisms are found in some international organizations such as the
124
European Union. Even when binding voting is available, Arrow’s
Theorem tells us about the shortcomings of such voting as a means of
coordinating decision-makers. For voting to retain both Pareto

121. This definition of hierarchy comes from MILLER, supra note 6, at 16.
122. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 8-13, 57, 216-18.
123. See id. at 47-50 (citing Roger B. Myerson & Mark A. Satterthwaite, Efficient
Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading, 29 J. ECON. THEORY 265 (1983)).
124. For voting mechanisms that bind dissenting states with the European Union, see J.
DINNAGE & J. MURPHY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 26 (2d ed.
2008) (qualified majority voting by member states).
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optimality and coherence (i.e., the transitivity of collective choices) in
the coordination of decision-making, we must restrict the range of
125
voter preferences. In general, we can restrict the preferences of
decision-makers through incentives, through screening the decisionmakers whom we admit to the voting process, and through social
norms. Incentives, however, can be impractical to use because of their
expense.126 Screening decision-makers can only be done if we are
willing to coordinate international decision-making on less than a
global basis. Social norms may be the only means of limiting
preferences among sovereign decision-makers.
Hierarchy is unavailable as a means of coordinating decisionmaking in a world of sovereign decision-makers. We have no central
decision-maker who exercises authority over nations. Without
hierarchy, we cannot set up enforcement mechanisms for markets,
bargains, or voting. Nor can we set up proper incentive systems to
elicit otherwise hidden action and hidden information or to restrict
the range of preferences. Without hierarchy, we must rely on social
norms alone to complete the coordination of decision-making by
markets, bargaining, and voting.
Thus, international social norms are an important part of the
solution to international collective action problems. Social norms are
a means of fostering shared knowledge and cooperative behavior in
order to improve global economic development. Unaided by
hierarchy, social norms must carry a heavy burden.
The lack of a central authority over nations has five ramifications
for the use of social norms to coordinate international decisionmaking in economic development. First, we have no need to create
vertical norms of commitment; without a central authority, sovereign
decision-makers need not fear that their decision-making authority
will be appropriated by the center. Second, we cannot create vertical
norms of reciprocal cooperation and thus cannot use such vertical
norms to foster the development of horizontal social norms. Third, we
125. This is the Sen Paradox. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 86-89 (citing AMARTYA SEN,
COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970); Amartya Sen, Liberty, Unanimity, and
Rights, 43 ECONOMICA 217 (1976); Amartya Sen, Liberty and Social Choice, 80 J. PHIL. 5
(1983)).
126. See Bengt Holmstrom, Moral Hazard in Teams, 13 BELL J. ECON. 324 (1982) (noting
that the cost of incentives to employees outweighs the benefit of increased productivity); see
also Peter Klibanoff & Jonathan Morduch, Decentralization, Externalities, and Efficiency, 62
REV. ECON. STUD. 223, 231-35 (1995) (discussing possibility that the cost of inducement exceeds
the benefit of coordination among actors, thus challenging the design by a central authority of a
reward and punishment system intended to induce their cooperation).
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cannot create property rights that facilitate the creation of
appropriate horizontal social norms. Nations must create those norms
127
without the benefit of property rights set by a central authority.
Fourth, we cannot enforce horizontal norms, once they arise, by a
hierarchy. Fifth, without a central authority, we can model the
collective action problems of nations by repeated game theory.
The appropriate social norms will extend the time horizon of
nations as decision-makers. The appropriate norms include norms of
reciprocated cooperation and reciprocated effort; the norms must
address externalities and hidden action in inter-dependent work. The
norms must also address the problem of hidden knowledge; a nation
may need information to enforce its laws that is possessed by another
nation.
Social norms that coordinate sovereign decision-making in our
pursuit of global economic development become part of the standards
and limitations we develop for the exercise of sovereign discretion.
The standards for and limitations on the design of national economic
environments are social norms, and they counter both abuses of
sovereign discretion and international collective action problems.
1. Anti-Deferral Regimes
A national income tax code generally does not tax a resident
entity’s foreign subsidiaries. At most, a tax code waits until the
subsidiaries distribute their income to the resident entity and taxes
the income at that time. The tax code is said to defer the taxation of a
foreign subsidiary’s income until the income is repatriated. An antideferral regime is a set of provisions in a national tax code that
overrides the deferral of tax on the income of foreign subsidiaries.
When the regime applies, the tax code taxes the income of foreign
subsidiaries to the resident entity without delay.
Anti-deferral regimes are said to embody a dilemma. When they
apply and tax the income of foreign subsidiaries currently, the
regimes advance a policy of tax neutrality in the choice of location in
which to conduct a business operation, either domestic or foreign, and
in the choice of entity, either a subsidiary or a branch. When the antideferral regimes do not apply and the national tax codes defer the
taxation of the income of foreign subsidiaries, the regimes advance a
127. For an elaboration of the use of property rights by a central authority to foster
horizontal social norms, see MILLER, supra note 6, at 211 (discussing management created
property rights for self-directed work teams in order to foster the development of good
horizontal norms within those work teams).
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policy of promoting the competitiveness of foreign subsidiaries in
their marketplaces. The two policies of tax neutrality and
competitiveness are said to be irreconcilable, with the anti-deferral
regime being a pawn in the battle between advocates of the two
policies.
The dilemma is only apparent, however. Once we recall that our
overall goal is the well-being of the world’s people, and once we
realize that global economic development is necessary to achieve that
goal, the dilemma falls away. Global economic development becomes
the higher objective that orders the relationship between warring
policies. Our objective of global economic development calls for a set
of autonomous decision-makers on the same plane of authority,
serves as a brief for those decision-makers, and sets standards for and
limitations on the exercise of their discretion. Those standards and
limitations specify the general outlines of national tax codes to
minimize the exploitation of individuals and to reduce opportunism in
international relations. The brief for global economic development
and the set of standards and limitations partly define the competence
of nations.
Recall the primary norms that the standards and limitations
suggest for the international taxation of business and investment
income. For business income, a nation may tax only the income from
business operations conducted within its own economic environment.
A nation is not to tax the income of foreign branches and subsidiaries.
Furthermore, a nation is to apply uniform rates of taxation to all
business income and not grant preferential rates to the income of
foreign-owned business operations. For portfolio income, a nation
may tax the worldwide investment income of its residents. A nation is
not to tax the portfolio income of foreign investors.
What function do anti-deferral regimes serve under these norms
of international taxation? In particular, does the adoption of
exemption systems of taxation for business income eliminate the need
for anti-deferral regimes? No. When our goal is global economic
development, anti-deferral regimes define impermissible tax
avoidance and solve collective action problems in the enforcement of
national tax law. From this point of view, anti-deferral regimes are a
species of anti-avoidance regime. A nation’s anti-deferral regime
supports its taxpayers’ compliance with their national tax code and,
by solving collective action problems in the enforcement of other
nations’ tax codes, supports compliance with those other tax codes.
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Anti-deferral regimes have five functions to serve. First, the
regimes must police the diversion of business income from its
economic environment to another taxing jurisdiction. Thus, incomeextractive arrangements and income-shifting arrangements are
properly within the ambit of anti-deferral regimes. Second, antideferral regimes must police attempts to change the apparent
residence of an investor through the interposition of an entity
between the investor and its portfolio income. As a result, incomeholding arrangements and the taxation of income from liquid passive
assets would also fall within the ambit of anti-deferral regimes. Third,
anti-deferral regimes may be used to neutralize the effect of
preferential tax regimes.128 Fourth, anti-deferral regimes may address
the income from business operations that are difficult to allocate to
any nation’s economic environment. The income from the operation
of highly mobile business assets, such as ships or satellites, would fall
within the scope of anti-deferral regimes. Fifth, for nations with
classical systems of corporate and individual income taxation, antideferral regimes may police the de facto distribution of profits
without the declaration of a formal dividend or through the sale of
the shareholder’s investment in the multinational enterprise.129 Some
of these functions address collective action problems themselves,
while others, perhaps all, give rise to collective action problems in
their enforcement. The first two of these functions are discussed
below.
A nation’s anti-deferral regime may take any of several forms.
130
Some nations target income subject to a low rate of foreign tax.
Others target income that arises in a nation appearing on their list of
131
suspect jurisdictions. Two nations use neither a tax rate nor a list of
nations, but instead identify income by the type of transaction giving

128. See discussion of an anti-deferral regime infra Part IV.B.1(a).
129. In the United States, these matters are addressed by sections 956 and 1248 of the
Internal Revenue Code. I.R.C. §§ 956, 1248 (2006).
130. For example, Japan’s anti-deferral system uses a low rate of foreign tax to identify
income subject to current taxation. See Yoshihiro Masui, Comment: A Japanese View, 52 SMU
L. REV. 541, 543 (1999).
131. David Rosenbloom proposes the converse of this approach for the United States.
Under his approach, all income of foreign subsidiaries of American multinational enterprises
would be taxed currently except for income arising in a list of nations with well-developed tax
systems. See Rosenbloom, supra note 54, at 1535-39, 1544-46.
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rise to the income.132 Nations that do not use a low rate of tax to
identify potentially diverted income may apply a high-tax kickout,
that is, exempting income from their anti-deferral regimes if it was
subject to a high rate of foreign tax. There are other possible
133
structures.
(a) The Diversion of Business Income
The standards and limitations suggest that business income ought
to fall within the exclusive taxing jurisdiction of the nation in whose
economic environment the underlying business operation was
conducted. Taxpayers, however, may attempt to shift the apparent
origin of their business income away from its economic environment
to a lower-tax jurisdiction. Their attempts may be categorized as
either
income-extracting
arrangements
or
income-shifting
arrangements.
Income-extracting arrangements rely on intercorporate
deductions within the multinational group to extract income from the
high-tax jurisdictions in which it was earned and reposition the
income in lower-tax jurisdictions. Income is paid out as deductible
interest, rent, or royalties. Subsidiaries are capitalized mainly with
debt and are leased or licensed the assets necessary for their
operations. A single business might be unbundled into separate
activities and divided among different tax jurisdictions. For example,
a business’ intellectual property can be segregated into a separate
entity charged with managing the income stream thus created from
in-house licensing fees. Recalling the separation of a vacuum into
matter and anti-matter, some taxpayers create paired but completely
132. In informal remarks, Philip West has commented that, of all the nations with an antideferral regime, only Canada and the United States do not tie the regime to a list of countries or
a tax rate. Panel Transcript III, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1611, 1616 (2001).
133. John Steines would structure the United States anti-deferral regime as a minimum tax
on the income of foreign subsidiaries. U.S. shareholders could credit whatever foreign taxes
were paid by the controlled foreign corporation against the U.S. minimum tax. When the
income was repatriated, U.S. shareholders would receive a credit for both the foreign tax and
the residual U.S. minimum tax. See Steines, supra note 72, at 1606. Steines notes that several
other countries employ a minimum tax approach. Id. Robert Peroni, Cliff Fleming, and Stephen
Shay advocate the domestic taxation of a multinational enterprise’s worldwide income and
would deny in all cases the deferral of taxation of the income of foreign subsidiaries. They
advocate a flow-through model of taxation for the income of foreign subsidiaries rather than an
imputed dividend model. Under a flow-through model, losses and the underlying character of
income flow through to the shareholder. A deduction for host-country income taxes is not
created. Peroni, Fleming, and Shay would not retain a minimum ownership requirement. See
Robert J. Peroni et al., Getting Serious About Curtailing Deferral of U.S. Tax on Foreign Source
Income, 52 SMU L. REV. 455, 507-12 (1999).
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offsetting risks within a corporate family and, through derivative
contracts between family members, divert income from one
jurisdiction to another. A tax haven company might be used as an
intermediate holding company to receive dividends and deductible
payments.
National tax codes counter income-extracting arrangements by
limiting the deductions and deferral necessary for the extractive
techniques to work. For example, cross-border interest deductions
134
Interest
might be limited for thinly capitalized subsidiaries.
payments might be recharacterized as non-deductible dividends. Or,
the income of an intermediate holding company might be imputed to
the ultimate parent company.
Income-shifting arrangements, on the other hand, usually employ
simple transfer pricing abuse. Transactions with outside customers or
clients are booked to tax haven entities even though the work
producing the income from those transactions is performed by other
entities in higher-tax jurisdictions. Income shifting arrangements are
illustrated well by the facts of the Du Pont case.135 Du Pont created a
Swiss subsidiary to handle its European marketing and sales. Du Pont
would sell products to the Swiss subsidiary, which in turn would sell
the products to independent European distributors. By design, the
transfer pricing Du Pont used with its Swiss subsidiary was to leave
the lion’s share of the combined companies’ profit in Switzerland.
Switzerland had a preferential tax regime that taxed the Swiss
subsidiary’s income only lightly. Because of the transfer pricing used,
the Swiss subsidiary’s income included part of the parent’s
manufacturing income as well as the parent’s sales income.
National tax codes counter income-shifting arrangements by
limiting the transfer pricing and deferral necessary for the techniques
to work. Tax administrators might reallocate income away from the
tax haven entity to better reflect the relative contributions of related
entities to the completion of a contract. Or, the income booked to tax
haven subsidiaries might be imputed to the ultimate parent company.
Transfer-pricing rules frequently are ineffective. Rules that are
based on arms-length pricing among entities are stymied by the
contributions of proprietary intangibles and group economies in

134. The U.S. tax code accomplishes this through the earnings-stripping rules of section 163.
See I.R.C. § 163(j) (2006).
135. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 608 F.2d 445 (Ct. Cls. 1979). This preSubpart F case arose under Code section 482. Id. at 446.
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transaction costs.136 Profit-split methods are more realistic, but
encounter problems as nations use inconsistent formulas. Antideferral regimes exist in part because of the significant problems with
transfer pricing rules. By imputing the income of a foreign subsidiary
to a parent company, an anti-deferral regime creates quite roughly a
consolidated entity.
Unfortunately, anti-deferral regimes are unsatisfactory as well.
Anti-deferral regimes are necessarily blunt weapons, overriding the
uncertainties of transfer pricing and subjective intent. As blunt
weapons, however, they capture and penalize ordinary business
arrangements made by the unwary. For example, the anti-deferral
rules that target the income shifted to regional holding companies
also capture ordinary intercorporate loans and leases. Just as with
transfer-pricing rules, we have problems with the inconsistent
treatment of income by nations. Anti-deferral regimes also can be
quite complex, leading to an unanticipated interplay with other taxing
137
provisions.
Furthermore, anti-deferral regimes fall victim to a serious
collective action problem. International law allocates among nations
general prescriptive jurisdiction over companies in such a way that a
nation may apply its anti-deferral regime only against its own
multinational groups. A nation cannot apply its anti-deferral regime
against transfer pricing abuses of a foreign-based multinational
enterprise, even though it might affect its own tax collections from the
domestic member of the group. This limitation requires each nation
to impede income-shifting arrangements of its own multinational
groups that affect other nations’ tax bases, even when the
arrangements do not affect its own tax base.
For example, the United States’ anti-deferral regime cannot
reach diversionary transactions between the subsidiaries of a German
parent corporation, one of which is incorporated within the United
States. At most, the United States can use its transfer pricing rules
136. Accurate transfer pricing would also reflect the degree of decentralization at the
organization and the attendant incentive structure for division managers. Bengt Holmstrom &
Jean Tirole, Transfer Pricing and Organizational Form, 7 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 201, 202-03
(1991).
137. According to Charles Kingson, U.S. multinational enterprises can now avoid two
important features of the U.S. anti-deferral regime by the use of that nation’s check-the-box
regulations: the inclusion within foreign personal holding company income of intra-group
returns from non-portfolio investment and the inclusion of income from transactions with
foreign related persons. Charles I. Kingson, Leonardo da Vinci and the 861 Regulations, 26
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1565, 1569-70 (2001).
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and provisions for the denial of deductions. Only the nation with
prescriptive jurisdiction over the parent corporation can apply its
anti-deferral regime to the entities controlled by the parent. The
United States must depend on Germany’s anti-deferral regime to
back up the American transfer pricing rules. Conversely, Germany
must rely on the United States’ anti-deferral regime to back up its
transfer pricing rules in the case of transactions to which a German
subsidiary of a United States parent corporation is a party.
Not all nations will institute anti-deferral regimes. Nations
wanting to attract the parent companies of multinational enterprises
as residents will refrain from doing so. Multinational enterprises can
then avoid anti-deferral regimes through the use of such headquarters
138
tax havens. Changing the definition of residence might not solve the
problem of the expatriation of companies to headquarters tax
havens.139
The formulary apportionment of a multinational group’s income
among nations would solve the problem of expatriation by
eliminating the need for the concept of corporate residence.
Furthermore, ideal formulary apportionment would eliminate the
need for international transfer pricing rules and the need for antideferral regimes to address income-shifting transactions. We will
consider formulary apportionment shortly, after we examine the use
of anti-deferral regimes to counter the diversion of portfolio income.
(b) The Diversion of Portfolio Income
The standards and limitations suggest that portfolio income
ought to fall within the exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction of the
nation of which the investor is a resident. The investor’s nation of
residence is entitled to tax the investor’s worldwide portfolio income.
However, an investor might transfer her portfolio investment assets
to an entity resident in another nation in an attempt to take
advantage of the other nation’s lower tax rates on investment income.
The arrangement diverts portfolio income away from the investor and
into a holding entity owned by the investor. Nations thwart this
maneuver by means of their anti-deferral regimes. The entity’s
portfolio income is imputed to the investor, or the investor is charged
interest until the investor repatriates the income. The appreciation in
value of the investment assets might also be taxed to the investor at

138. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 52, at 1665-66.
139. Id.
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the time the investor initially transfers the assets out of the
jurisdiction.
Unfortunately, an investor may mask her identity through the
use of a conduit tax haven and thus avoid the exchange-ofinformation obligations between the nation paying the portfolio
140
income and the investor’s nation of residence.
2. Formulary Apportionment
A foundation for international taxation must allocate business
income derived by a multinational enterprise among the nations in
which the enterprise operates. The standards for and limitations on
the exercise of sovereign discretion have already suggested that
nations should adopt exemption systems for the taxation of
international business income. Exemption systems require that
business income be allocated among nations on the basis of the
location of the business operation that generated the income.
Traditionally, an enterprise’s business income has been allocated
among nations according to rules classifying the income according to
type; rules based on that classification that identify the nations that
are the source of the income; rules that allocate deductions among
nations; rules that define the presence of a business operation, or
permanent establishment, in a nation; and rules that attribute types of
income to a permanent establishment. Rules of transfer pricing
correct the division of income among related taxpayers. Additional
rules govern the manner in which income is taxed by a nation once
the income is identified with a particular nation. Such rules of
classification, source, permanent establishment, and attribution are
adjusted by the terms of tax treaties, when a treaty applies.
The traditional approach assumes that a multinational enterprise
is a collection of legally separate entities that operate and are
managed autonomously. Each subsidiary operates a separate business
and frequently in only one nation, is managed independently from the
other formal entities within the multinational enterprise, and deals
with those other entities at arm’s length, as if those entities conducted
independent businesses. Branches, if they exist, are frequently
imagined to be separate entities. The rules are geared to legal entities
and, moreover, to legal entities that operate, and are managed,
distinctly from one another.

140. See id. at 1665. Infra Pt. IV.B.2 proposes a secondary norm of international taxation to
respond to this problem.
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The traditional approach fails to appreciate the economics of
organization for many multinational enterprises. First, the
multinational enterprise is not a collection of independently managed
subsidiaries dealing with one another at arm’s length. The
competitive advantage of the complex organization over a collection
of independent actors in the market place is the organization’s ability,
through hierarchy, to reduce the transaction costs incurred by the
141
loose collection of market actors. Arms-length transfer pricing
misses the income attributable to the enterprise’s ability to reduce the
transaction costs of the marketplace.142
Second, one of the transaction costs reduced by the multinational
form of enterprise is the cost of protecting intangibles through
licensing agreements with outside persons. When the terms of
licensing agreements cannot protect an enterprise’s intangibles at
reasonable cost, the entity itself must undertake the international use
of its intangibles.143 This in-house use of intangibles makes transfer
pricing difficult; the unique nature of intangibles make comparisons
difficult for purposes of pricing.
Third, the structure of the management of a multinational
enterprise’s operations does not follow the structure of its ownership
of its subsidiaries. It is true that a multinational enterprise must
delegate decision-making authority to autonomous actors, subject to
standards and limitations. However, the multi-divisional form that the
management of a multinational enterprise usually takes groups sets of
subsidiaries together and operates them in an integrated fashion.144
The internal reporting of the multinational enterprise follows the
management structure rather than the ownership structure. The
entity-specific accounting of the enterprise can be an afterthought.
Thus, transfer pricing is a serious problem for the traditional
approach. The operations of a multinational enterprise may be easily
attributed to specific nations, but the income of those operations
might not. The traditional approach also encounters the problem of

141. See RONALD H. COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET, AND THE LAW 38-40 (1988).
142. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arms-Length Pricing, 15 VA. TAX REV.
89, 148-49 (1995).
143. See WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 290-94, 296 (discussing the
suggestion by transaction cost economics that foreign direct investment is made by companies
that are technically innovative and that cannot safeguard their intangibles through long-term
contracts).
144. See id. (explaining that the foreign subsidiary is managed as part of a single multidivisional enterprise, not as an autonomous subsidiary).
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inconsistent national rules for defining permanent establishments,
classifying income, identifying the source of income, and attributing
income to permanent establishments. Tax treaties give bilateral
solutions to the definition of permanent establishments, and advance
pricing agreements give limited relief for the problem of transfer
pricing, but the other problems remain.
In principle, a promising approach is the formulary
apportionment of a multinational enterprise’s income among the
nations in which it operates. Such an approach determines the
aggregate taxable income of a multinational enterprise and then
allocates that income according to a formula among the nations in
145
which its operations are located. The participating nations must
agree on the factors taken into account by the formula and the
weighting the factors are to have in the formula. One approach would
allocate income among nations on the basis of sales, labor costs,
assets, and research and development costs.146 The inclusion of
research and development costs would capture the contribution of

145. Formulary apportionment in effect attributes a multinational enterprise’s residual
income (in the transfer pricing sense) to all of the factors used as variables in the formula.
Because an enterprise’s residual income reflects, among other things, its return from reducing
the transaction costs encountered by a group of independent actors in the marketplace, such
treatment of an enterprise’s residual income is preferable to one that attributes all of the
residual income to a single factor. For example, the U.S. profit-split method allocates all
residual income to a company’s intangibles. See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6(c)(3)(i)(B).
146. See Graetz, supra note 59, at 319-20. For another proposal for international formulary
apportionment, see Avi-Yonah, Simplificaion, supra note 76, at 1348-49. The proposal to include
sales as a factor in the apportioning formula would permit a nation in which the enterprise sells
its products or services without a sales operation to tax part of the enterprise’s income. This
contrasts with the traditional approach, which requires a sales operation or other permanent
establishment in a nation before the nation may tax the sales income of a non-resident
enterprise. Several commentators have argued that the domestic consumption of imported
goods and services should be a basis for a nation’s taxation of income. Stephen Shay, Cliff
Fleming, and Robert Peroni argue that a source-based tax can be justified as the price of access
to a nation’s markets. Stephen E. Shay et al., “What’s Source Got to Do With It?” Source Rules
and U.S. International Taxation, 56 TAX L. REV. 81, 91-93 (2002). Michael Graetz puts it
differently. He first points out that “consumption taxes may be imposed in a manner quite
similar to income taxes.” Graetz, supra note 59, at 299 (citing Michael Graetz, International
Aspects of Fundamental Tax Restructuring: Practice or Principle?, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1093,
1097-98 (1997)). Because of this, he believes that a nation that hosts a market for a product but
not a sales operation may have a claim to tax the income derived from sales in its market. Id.
Reuven Avi-Yonah also calls for the allocation of income to consuming nations for purposes of
income taxation. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 52, at 1670-75; Reuven S. Avi-Yonah,
International Taxation of Electronic Commerce, 52 TAX L. REV. 507, 544-45 (1997). Avi-Yonah
would enforce the consuming nation’s taxation of the sales income of an enterprise that had no
sales operation within its jurisdiction by means of a withholding tax on sales. Avi-Yonah,
Globalization, supra note 52, at 1672-74.
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intangibles to the production of the enterprise’s income.147 The
portfolio income earned by a corporation could be added to its
business income and taxed by source, that is, by apportioning the
income among nations according to an international formula.148
Formulary apportionment would eliminate the need for rules
governing transfer pricing, the classification of income, the
determination of the source of income, and the residence of a
corporation.149 By eliminating the need to determine a corporation’s
residence, formulary apportionment addresses the vulnerability of
anti-deferral regimes to the expatriation of parent companies to
headquarters tax havens. Furthermore, formulary apportionment
would eliminate the need to track inter-corporate payments within
the multinational enterprise. Moreover, formulary apportionment
could be used to define the concept of permanent establishment.150 A
permanent establishment could be deemed to exist in a nation if the
formula allocates to that nation more than a pre-determined amount
of the enterprise’s income. Below that amount, de minimis by
definition, a nation would not tax the enterprise on its income.151
Formulary apportionment coupled with exemption systems would
also permit the elimination of the foreign tax credit, parts of antideferral regimes, the branch profits tax, and the earnings stripping
152
rule.
Formulary apportionment must be implemented on a
multilateral basis. Enterprises are unlikely to agree to formulary
apportionment unless all nations in which an enterprise operates
participate and do so on a uniform basis. For the simplest
multinational enterprises, formulary apportionment could be

147. See Graetz, supra note 59, at 317.
148. See Avi-Yonah, Simplification, supra note 76, at 1353. Avi-Yonah would tax passive
foreign investment companies (foreign mutual funds, generally) on the basis of source, however,
as if they were banks or other financial institutions. See id. at 1354.
149. Taxing business income at source, rather than on the basis of residence, reduces the
need to establish the residence of a corporation. See Graetz, supra note 59, at 323 (eliminating
the benefit to a multinational enterprise of manipulating its residence, by apportioning its
income among nations according to a formula).
150. See id. at 319-20.
151. Reuven Avi-Yonah would define a permanent establishment as a minimum level of
sales into a jurisdiction. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 52, at 1671.
152. See Avi-Yonah, Simplification, supra note 76, at 1354-55. On the basis of his specific
proposals, Avi-Yonah would eliminate the Subpart F and PFIC provisions, but retain the FPHC
provisions. See id.
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introduced through advance pricing agreements, to which typically
only two nations are party.
Unfortunately, the implementation of formulary apportionment
runs into a virtually insurmountable problem. Participating nations
must agree on a common definition of the enterprise’s taxable
income. This requires agreement on the definitions of gross income
and deductions and the treatment of losses. In particular,
participating nations must agree on depreciation schedules for the
enterprise.
In
effect,
formulary
apportionment
requires
harmonization of national tax codes, a task open to anti-competitive
153
abuse and requiring Herculean effort.
Without formulary apportionment, we are left with the
traditional approach to exemption systems, which require the
attribution of income to permanent establishments. Losses would not
be deductible unless they were attributable to the permanent
establishment.
3. Tax Treaties
Tax treaties are a means of solving collective action problems
through the conscious creation of social norms. Tax treaties adjust the
allocation among nations of prescriptive jurisdiction over the global
tax base through the coordination of primary norms of taxation and
the withdrawal of secondary norms of taxation.

153. For a discussion of the challenges of harmonizing national tax codes, see Roin, supra
note 48, at 594-97; see also Julie A. Roin, Taxation Without Coordination, 31 J. LEGAL STUD.
S61 (2002); but see Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L.
REV. 259, 262 (2003) (proposing a partial and gradual harmonization of nations’ international
tax rules other than their tax rates). The inter-governmental debates required for tax
harmonization may lead to the compromise of different apportioning formulas for different
industries. There are other challenges in the implementation of formulary apportionment. First,
nations would have to agree on whether the apportioning formula is to be applied separately to
an enterprise’s separate businesses. To do so might re-introduce transfer pricing problems, as
the income of the separate businesses is segregated. Second, corporate minority shareholders
and pass-through entities, such as partnerships, raise the question of the sequence of
apportioning income among nations and among participants in enterprises. It seems best to first
apply formulary apportionment to the multinational enterprise’s income and allocate its income
among nations. Each nation may then apply its rules for the allocation of the income among
partners or investors in the enterprise. In this approach, the nationality of the multinational
enterprise is irrelevant, and no international consensus is needed on the permissible allocation
of income among partners under each nation’s tax code. A drawback of this approach is that the
income of the controlling participant might be apportioned differently from the rest of its
income, inviting the creation of partnerships simply to avoid the full effect of international
formulary apportionment.
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Almost all tax treaties in existence today are bilateral. Most of
these treaties are based on the common model sponsored by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).
The OECD model is a significant source of multilateral coordination
in the exercise by nations of prescriptive jurisdiction over the global
tax base.154 The use of multilateral treaties is taken up later in this
Article.155
Tax treaties can be analyzed in terms of transaction-cost
economics. In general, transaction-cost economics aligns transactions
with governance structures to economize on bounded rationality and
to reduce transaction costs, including the costs of opportunism.156 Tax
treaties serve as governance structures with regard to the parties’
transactions in prescriptive jurisdiction. Tax treaties are enhanced
versions of Williamson’s hybrid governance structures, because the
treaty partners cannot seek judicial intervention as a last resort but
must rely entirely on the mechanisms they create in their treaties and
on follow-up negotiations.157
In a sense, the partners to a tax treaty find themselves in a
bilateral monopoly. They share a highly specific asset: the tax base of
158
income flows that cross their common border. This analogy with a
bilateral monopoly is not complete, however. If the partners cannot
agree to a division of their common tax base, they will both use the
entire shared tax base, which leads to over-taxation of their common
asset. In this sense, the treaty partners share a two-person commons.
Over-taxation may result in diminished returns for the two
governments.159
Tax treaties generally are used to limit the source-based taxation
of investment income in favor of residence-based taxation, to
eliminate source-based taxation of de minimis amounts of business
income, to eliminate overlapping definitions of tax residence, and for
the exchange of information about taxpayers. Tax treaties also
154. See Hugh J. Ault, The Importance of International Cooperation in Forging Tax Policy,
26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1693, 1694 (2001).
155. See infra Pt. IV.B.3.
156. See WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 2, at 12 (the discriminating alignment
hypothesis); WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 32, 72-79 (economizing on bounded
rationality and safeguarding against opportunism).
157. See WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS, supra note 2, at 10, 95-97; WILLIAMSON,
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 70-71.
158. See WILLIAMSON, INSTITUTIONS, supra note 15, at 52-56.
159. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (arguing
that overuse of a commons leading to diminished returns for all users).
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contain nondiscrimination clauses. Such clauses prevent a nation’s
retaliation against non-treaty nations from affecting the enterprises of
its treaty partners.
B. The Enforcement of Social Norms
Without a central authority to enforce social norms, we must rely
on self-enforcing norms and norms of punishment. A self-enforcing
social norm relies for its continued existence on each participant’s
belief that others will continue to observe the norm only as long as
the participant observes the norm and that the benefits to the
participant from the norm outweigh the costs.160 In this sense, social
161
norms are mutually reinforcing expectations of others’ behavior. In
a world of social convention, an actor must be concerned about the
effect that its behavior has on others. In perfectly competitive
markets, an actor cannot move the market, and hence its behavior has
no effect on other participants.
Social norms that are not self-enforcing must rely on norms of
punishment for their observance. Norms of punishment subject the
offending nation to different treatment by other nations. To the
extent that the standards for and limitations on sovereign discretion
are not self-enforcing, we will need a second set of social norms that
nations apply in their dealings with nations who fail to observe the
standards and limitations. Different treatment would include
retaliation through the imposition of externalities on those nations,
externalities that would shift the balance among the offending
nation’s interest groups to favor compliance with the primary norms.
The second set of norms change the offending nation’s payoffs in

160. See MILLER, supra note 6, at 204. George Akerlof has applied the social conventions of
gift exchange to labor contracts. See George A. Akerlof, Labor Contracts as Partial Gift
Exchange, 97 Q. J. ECON. 543 (1982).
161. We might view the rules of customary international law as self-enforcing social norms.
We can then screen purported rules of customary international law by asking whether nations’
self-interest would cause the norm to be honored widely and repeatedly and whether nations
have formed the belief that the compliance of others now depends on their own. Jack Goldsmith
and Eric Posner see the traditional rules of customary international law as emerging from
national self-interest in four strategic situations: the coincidence of interests, coercion, bilateral
cooperation, and bilateral coordination. Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of
Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113, 1114-15 (1999). Multilateral cooperation
and coordination through customary international law are unlikely in light of the assumptions
necessary in game theory to explain such behavioral regularities as a function of self-interest. Id.
at 1129-31; but see George Norman & Joel P. Trachtman, The Customary International Law
Game, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 541 (2005) (showing that game theory can explain multilateral
cooperation under certain circumstances).
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favor of the standards and limitations. This second set of social norms
must be self-enforcing, that is, it must be in the self-interest of the
enforcing nations to impose the norms of punishment in their dealings
with an offending nation.162
The social norms embodied by the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT) are illustrative. A primary norm of GATT
forbids the use of export subsidies by member nations. In the event
that a member nation enacts an export subsidy, other members may
invoke a secondary norm: each member that imports subsidized
goods from the offending member may impose a countervailing duty
on those imports. The countervailing duty is limited; it cannot exceed
the amount of the export subsidy. The permitted retaliation is
measured, unlike the retaliation that might be imposed on a nonmember nation.
Thus, GATT envisions three levels of treatment for a nation.
Member nations that respect the primary norm banning export
subsidies see their exports flow unimpeded by countervailing duties.
Member nations that subsidize their exports are subject to measured
countervailing duties. Non-members that subsidize their exports are
subject to arbitrary retaliation.
In contrast, tax treaties envision only two levels of treatment for
a nation. Parties that abide by the terms of a tax treaty enjoy
limitations on the foreign taxation of their residents’ income. Parties
that do not abide by the terms of a tax treaty or who are not parties to
a tax treaty enjoy no such limitations. Tax treaties do not include
norms of measured retaliation. Most tax treaties are bilateral; a
multilateral tax treaty would permit us to create secondary norms of
measured retaliation to enforce primary norms of international
taxation.
The secondary norms of GATT are self-enforcing; interest
groups within retaliating nations provide the pressure. We must only
be concerned with retaliation that fails to remain within the bounds
set by GATT. The pressure brought by interest groups on the
national decision-makers of GATT members is so strong at times that

162. Douglas Heckathorn concludes that self-interested players are more likely to enforce
norms of punishment than to observe first-order norms. See Douglas D. Heckathorn, Collective
Action and the Second Order Free Rider Problem, 1 RATIONALITY & SOC’Y 78 (1989). Credit
markets also have a role to play in the enforcement of social norms. Norms embodied in loan
agreements with the International Monetary Fund are indirectly enforced by the international
market for sovereign debt, which will refuse to reschedule existing debt or extend additional
credit to sovereigns in default of an IMF loan agreement.
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it threatens members’ own compliance with GATT’s primary
163
norms.
A mechanism for resolving disputes about appropriate levels of
treatment can be advantageous in maintaining social norms. The
dispute resolution mechanism of GATT is illustrative. GATT permits
member nations to impose countervailing duties that conform to its
terms. The European Union might have unilaterally imposed
countervailing duties on imports from the United States to offset the
export subsidies the union perceived in the U.S. tax code. Instead,
GATT first required the European Union to protest the perceived
export subsidies through the GATT dispute resolution mechanism.
Such a protest ultimately brings an end to the dispute about whether
the U.S. tax code violates a primary norm of GATT and prevents a
subsequent dispute about the propriety of any countervailing duties.
Social norms and mechanisms for the resolution of disputes allow
nations to form stable expectations about each other’s behavior.
Social norms extend each nation’s area of rationality by increasing the
range of alternatives that a sovereign can consider. The increased
range of alternatives counters some of the inevitable incompleteness
164
in making decisions. Arbitral decisions change the environment for
sovereign decision-making, by directing an offending sovereign’s
attention in its law-making. In so doing, arbitral decisions assist in the
integration of nations’ behavior in the face of collective action
165
problems.
Three questions arise in the evaluation of any secondary norm.
First, to what degree is the secondary norm self-enforcing, that is,
how likely is it that other nations will impose the secondary norm?
This question includes a consideration of the interest groups in a
retaliating nation that would press for the application of the
secondary norm. Second, to what extent will the secondary norm
cause offending nations to comply with the primary norm? This
question includes a consideration of the interest groups within the
163. Compare Certain Motor Vehicles and Certain Chassis and Bodies Therefor, USITC
Pub. 11110, Inv. No. TA-201-44 (Dec. 1980) (determining that an economic recession was a
greater cause of the U.S. automobile industry’s economic problems than an increase in imports)
with 19 U.S.C. § 2252(c)(2)(A) (added by the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988)
(directing the ITC to splinter a recession into multiple causes to lessen a recession’s importance
relative to an increase in imports).
164. For the inevitable incompleteness of decision-making, see supra notes 18-24 and
accompanying text.
165. Herbert Simon discusses the integration of behavior within a complex organization by
changing the environment for decision-making. See SIMON, supra note 8, at 106-17.
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offending nation that would lobby for compliance with the primary
norm once they come under pressure from the secondary norm.
Third, compared to other candidates for a secondary norm, will the
secondary norm do the least harm to our overall objective of global
economic development for the well-being of the world’s people?
1. Secondary Norms for the Taxation of Business Income
When a nation departs from the primary norms for the taxation
of business income, what are the appropriate secondary norms for
other nations to apply? As a response to a nation that enacts a
preferential tax regime, other nations might be permitted to impose
offsetting import duties on products and services exported by the
offending nation. This secondary norm would require coordination
with the norms of GATT. The appropriate response to a nation that
taxes the income of its residents’ foreign operations might be the
denial to the offending nation of the benefits under a proposed
multinational tax treaty of the exchange of information and
exemption from other nations’ default withholding taxes on portfolio
income. These and other alternatives are discussed below.
a. Countering Preferential Tax Regimes
The standards and limitations require that a nation treat foreignowned business operations no better and no worse than locally owned
business operations. We referred to this conclusion as the tax norm of
national treatment for foreign-owned business activity.166 This primary
tax norm would prohibit preferential tax regimes for foreign
investment.
A foreign investor might elicit a preferential tax regime by its
solicitation of bids from several nations for its investment. A nation
might offer a preferential tax regime in order to match the bids made
by other nations. An effective secondary norm would require nations
to lower uncompetitive general tax rates to attract foreign investment,
instead of offering preferential tax regimes available only to a foreign
investor.
The appropriate secondary norm would offset the benefit of a
preferential tax regime. There are two alternatives to consider. First,
we could permit the foreign investor’s home nation to tax the
business income derived under a host nation’s preferential tax regime.
The home nation’s rate of tax would be limited to the difference

166. See supra Pt. III.C.6.
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between the host nation’s general rate of taxation and its preferential
rate. This current taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries
operating under a preferential tax regime offsets the tax preference.
Would this proposed secondary norm be effective? Competitors
in the retaliating nation should support the imposition of the
secondary norm. In nations the social welfare system of which
depends on an individual being employed, labor groups would be a
second group supporting the secondary norm. What is unclear is
whether the secondary norm would pressure the offending nation to
change its behavior. No interest groups within the offending nation
would be affected by this kind of retaliation. Furthermore, it’s unclear
whether the retaliating nation would tax the foreign subsidiary or
branch of one of its own multinational enterprises in the face of
inaction by other nations.
The second method of offsetting the benefit of a preferential tax
regime takes advantage of the GATT regime of cross-retaliation to
pressure interest groups within the offending nation to lobby for
repeal of the preferential tax regime. Nations that import goods or
services from the offending nation might impose countervailing duties
on those imports, regardless of whether those imports were produced
with the benefit of the preferential tax regime. The indiscriminate
imposition of duties would help to ensure that interest groups within
the offending nation lobbied for the removal of the preferential tax
regime. We might need to modify the terms of GATT and GATS to
define the benefit of any preferential tax regime as an export subsidy.
b. Countering Residence-Based Taxation of Business Income
The standards and limitations suggest that a nation should
refrain from taxing the income of its residents’ foreign branches and
subsidiaries (other than under its anti-abuse regime). The taxation of
foreign branches and subsidiaries is of concern only to host nations
with lower tax rates than a multinational enterprise’s home nation.
Host nations with tax rates comparable to or higher than the home
nation would see no effect from the residence-based tax system due
167
to the workings of the home nation’s foreign tax credit. Nations
with lower tax rates include many with emerging markets.
To curb the taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries, we
must offer nations a treaty benefit that is contingent upon the

167. See GUSTAFSON, supra note 73, at 19-21 (comparing the exemption approach of
territorial tax systems with the foreign tax credit approach of worldwide tax systems).
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adoption of an exemption system for the taxation of business income
and that is withdrawn in the event that the nation reverts to the
taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries. Two treaty benefits
relating to the taxation of portfolio income fill our need: the exchange
of taxpayer information and the elimination of the substantial
withholding tax on portfolio income discussed below. A treaty party
that reintroduced the taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries
would see its residents’ portfolio income burdened by a substantial
withholding tax imposed by the advanced economies and would also
see its own tax on portfolio income absorbed by its foreign tax credit
and by tax evasion as it lost access to the information it needed to
enforce its own tax on portfolio income.
The imposition of a substantial withholding tax would be
ineffective unless all of the advanced economies were committed to
do so on behalf of affected low-tax nations. Otherwise, interest
groups within the offending nation would simply shift their portfolio
investment to other nations. In addition, debtor nations, a category
that includes many developing countries, would be reluctant to
impose such a retaliatory withholding tax. Under typical international
loan agreements, lenders charge any withholding taxes on their
interest income to their borrowers. Thus, a retaliatory withholding tax
would pit borrowers in the retaliating nation against the competitive
position of the injured nation’s tax on business income. For these
reasons, the suspension of the exchange of taxpayer information by
itself might be the likely form of retaliation.
An alternative secondary norm is the blocking statute, a form of
168
retaliation that can be imposed unilaterally. A blocking statute
forbids the repatriation of earnings by foreign subsidiaries or
branches; the ban prevents the parent company from repatriating
earnings with which to pay the tax levied by the home nation on the
multinational group’s foreign operations. A blocking statute has been
sufficient to eliminate the U.S. tax liability of a U.S. parent
company.169 However, the frequent use of blocking statutes by host
nations may lead home nations to ignore them and impose liability

168. Cross-retaliation by duties levied by the injured nation on goods and services imported
from the offending nation would require the creation of a new norm of GATT. The new norm
would have to outlaw the taxation of foreign branches and subsidiaries of resident enterprises.
169. See Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Commissioner, 961 F.2d 1255 (6th Cir. 1992) (holding a
Spanish blocking statute effective to prevent the imputation of income from a Spanish
subsidiary to a Swiss-based foreign subsidiary of a U.S. corporation, and the U.S. taxation of
that income).
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for tax regardless of the parent company’s inability to repatriate the
foreign income. Such a move would encounter internal resistance
from the home nation’s business groups. Blocking statutes also may
run afoul of bilateral investment treaties, which frequently require the
free repatriation of earnings by foreign investors.
2. A Secondary Norm for the Taxation of Portfolio Income
The primary norm for the taxation of portfolio income stipulates
that a nation has exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the portfolio
income of its residents. A nation may not tax the portfolio income of
another nation’s residents. When a nation departs from this primary
norm and taxes the portfolio income of nonresidents, what is the
appropriate secondary norm for other nations to follow? Other
nations would be permitted to retaliate in two ways: first, by their
conditional imposition of a substantial withholding tax on the
portfolio income of the offending nation’s own residents; and second,
by the suspension of their treaty obligations to exchange information
with the offending nation.
The retaliation would reduce the offending nation’s tax
collections from its own residents. If the offending nation offers a
foreign tax credit to its own residents, the retaliation would transfer
tax revenue from the offending nation to the retaliating nations. If the
offending nation does not offer its residents a foreign tax credit and
thus the retaliatory tax threatens to increase the tax burden on the
offending nation’s residents, the suspension of the exchange of
information permits the offending nation’s residents to evade their
own nation’s taxation of their portfolio income.
Nations could incorporate the secondary norm into their national
tax codes as a default provision, that is, as a permanent provision that
would be overridden by a nation’s treaties as long as each treaty is
honored. The withholding tax would apply to all payments of
portfolio income made to addresses in non-treaty nations, including
addresses in nations that did not engage in effective exchange of
information. The withholding tax would also deter conduit
arrangements through opaque tax havens and thus improve tax
compliance in residence nations, if the rate at which the withholding
tax is set exceeds the highest marginal rate on portfolio income set by
capital exporting nations.170 In this way, the withholding tax serves as

170. We would also need to eliminate bearer bonds, which can be done by denying interest
deductions to the would-be issuers. We might also enforce the primary norm by the denial of
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the secondary norm for another primary norm of international
taxation: the primary norm requiring transparency in the
administration of a nation’s tax code so that other nations may verify
the foreign portfolio income of their residents.
Would this secondary norm be effective? The widespread use of
withholding taxes on nonresidents’ portfolio income suggests that
nations are not at all reluctant to impose such a withholding tax.
After all, nonresident taxpayers don’t vote. One possible exception is
a withholding tax on interest payments to nonresidents. Resident
debtors would argue against the reimposition of a withholding tax on
interest payments, because under the typical international loan
agreement any withholding tax on the lender’s interest payments is
charged to the borrower. The effectiveness of the secondary norm
will turn on the willingness of offending governments to remove
withholding taxes on portfolio income in exchange for an improved
flow of information about (and improved flow of tax revenue from)
their resident taxpayers.171 Financial institutions within the offending
nation will be one source of pressure to drop the offending nation’s
withholding tax.
A multilateral treaty would be helpful for four reasons. First, a
multilateral treaty is required to impose a withholding tax on interest
172
income. Such a tax could not be imposed unilaterally, given the
current lack of withholding on portfolio interest income. No nation
would be willing to see inflows of portfolio investment diverted to
other nations. Second, a multilateral treaty would assist in the
creation of a regime for the exchange of tax information among
nations. Under the terms of a multilateral treaty, information
received by one nation from another could in turn be passed on to a
third nation. Third, a multilateral treaty would be required to create a
deductions for payments made to addresses in nations that violate the primary norm and by the
prohibition of bank transfers to those addresses. Unfortunately, both measures require global
and perfect information exchange. Either measure could be evaded by making the payments to
a recipient in a third nation, who would forward the payments on to a recipient in the offending
nation. In the case of a withholding tax, we must depend on the limitation-of-benefits provision
in the tax treaty with the third nation bolstered by information exchange with that third nation
to identify conduit payments into the offending nation against which the withholding tax is
aimed.
171. One insightful analysis has raised the possibility that national decision-makers actually
condone the evasion of domestic taxes by wealthy taxpayers through the use of tax haven
intermediaries. See Roin, supra note 48, at 599-601.
172. See Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 52, at 1667-70. For this purpose, the
membership of a multilateral treaty could begin with OECD members, the primary destination
for foreign portfolio investment.
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refundable withholding tax. A refundable withholding tax can
reinforce a regime for the exchange of information. An investor
resident in a treaty nation would be able to obtain a refund of the
withholding tax by reporting its portfolio income to its nation of
173
residence. An investor resident in a tax haven would receive no
refund, if the tax haven were not a party to the multilateral treaty.
Multilateral action would be required to create the necessary
clearinghouse among nations for refunds to investors and net tax
collections to nations. Tax-exempt organizations and tax-exempt
collective investment vehicles such as pension funds could receive a
full refund of the tax. Fourth, a multilateral treaty would ease the
transition away from the reciprocity found in bilateral treaties in
reductions in withholding taxes.174
3. A Multilateral Treaty and Collective Action Problems
A multinational treaty would be useful in the creation of
effective secondary norms of measured retaliation to enforce the
primary norms of international taxation. Such a treaty would set out
the primary norms so that the proper application of the secondary
175
Furthermore, the treaty could establish a
norms is known.
mechanism for the resolution of disputes about whether violations of
the primary norms have occurred and about the proper use of the
secondary norms.176 This structure of primary norms, secondary norms
of measured retaliation, and a dispute resolution mechanism is
already present in GATT, which suggests that we might take the

173. See id. at 1668-69 (proposing a refundable withholding tax).
174. Alvin Warren has argued for the abandonment of reciprocity in favor of reformed
notions of nondiscrimination and neutrality that take into account the integration of corporate
and personal income taxes. See Alvin C. Warren, Jr., Alternatives for International Corporate
Tax Reform, 49 TAX L. REV. 599, 611-13 (1994); see also Julie Roin, Rethinking Tax Treaties in a
Strategic World With Disparate Tax Systems, 81 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1755-56, 1799 (1995)
(advocating the adoption of treaties allowing a greater measure of source taxation when
nations’ tax systems differ with regard to the integration of corporate and personal income
taxation).
175. In game theoretic terms, treaties provide the communication between parties that is
required in strategic situations calling for multilateral cooperation and coordination. See
Goldsmith & Posner, supra note 161, at 1131, 1170-72.
176. Others have pointed out that a multilateral treaty is needed to address preferential tax
regimes, apportionment formulae for the income of multinational enterprises, electronic
commerce, treaty overlaps, treaty shopping, and triangular tax treaty problems. See Victor
Thuronyi, International Tax Cooperation and a Multilateral Treaty, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1641,
1644, 1651, 1654-55, 1661-62 (2001); Diane M. Ring, Prospects for a Multilateral Tax Treaty, 26
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1699, 1701 n.3 (2001).
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approach of incorporating within GATT the terms of a multinational
177
tax treaty.
A multilateral treaty would also be useful in the creation of a
multilateral withholding tax on portfolio income, a refund mechanism
for the withholding tax, and multilateral information exchange. The
tax treaty could take the form of a pluralateral treaty chiefly among
OECD members, who together are the primary location for portfolio
investment.
A drawback of a multilateral treaty, however, is the opportunity
its negotiation presents for collusion among sovereigns to engage in
anti-competitive behavior, such as an agreement to harmonize tax
rates.
CONCLUSION
This Article proposes the institutional competence of nations in
global economic development as a foundation for international tax
law. A notion of constrained sovereign discretion lies at the heart of
the proposal.
The Article constructs the institutional competence of nations in
global economic development from institutional economics, simple
game theory, and the literature on social norms. The Article
expresses the institutional competence of nations through standards
and limitations that reduce the abuse of sovereign discretion and
address international collective action problems in the pursuit of
global economic development. These standards and limitations
allocate prescriptive jurisdiction among nations over the global
income tax base.
The Article began its project by reviewing the value to global
economic development of the use of multiple, autonomous decisionmakers to shape the world’s economic environment. The use of
multiple, sovereign decision-makers gives us, among other benefits,
sovereign competition and a variety of approaches in the design of

177. Reuven Avi-Yonah suggests the WTO as the appropriate organization to address
preferential tax regimes. He points out that the organization already addresses tax matters that
affect international trade and has bolstered its expertise in tax matters. Avi-Yonah, Treating,
supra note 91, at 1689-92 (referring to preferential tax regimes as “harmful tax competition”).
Victor Thuronyi would institute an evolutionary process that ultimately would yield a
multilateral treaty separate from GATT, administered by an independent international
organization. Thuronyi, supra note 176, at 1667-80. Diane Ring would begin with focused,
topical multilateral agreements and offers suggestions on voting structure and power within an
eventual international tax organization. Ring, supra note 176, at 1703-07.
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national economic environments. A variety of approaches is essential
because it enables us to use the comparative method to evaluate the
relative efficacy of different economic environments, thus partly
overcoming our inherent lack of information about endowments, our
inability to use controlled experiments in the public sphere, and the
inevitable incompleteness of decision-making. Hence, the
institutional competence of nations ratifies the existence of sovereign
discretion in global economic development.
Nations can abuse their sovereign discretion, however. The
immediate needs of a nation’s public decision-makers and the efforts
of organized groups to ameliorate market conditions can be causes of
such abuse. The design of institutions within a nation’s economic
environment reflects the goals and transaction costs of legislators,
interested constituents, and the holders of residual interests.
The abuse of sovereign discretion may take several forms. A
nation might depart from the goal that justifies the existence of its
discretion in economic development, possibly exploiting individuals
for the benefit of various organized groups. A nation might also
export costs to, or import benefits from, other nations.
To limit such abuse, the Article turned to standards and
limitations to define the institutional competence of nations. Among
other constraints, the Article discussed standards of neutrality for
legislation and limitations on subsidies, in both cases drawing on our
experience with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
The Article also proposed three norms of international law that
would limit a nation’s discretion to design its tax code. First, a nation
would have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over the income
derived from business operations conducted within its territory.
Second, a nation would have exclusive prescriptive jurisdiction over
portfolio income derived anywhere in the world from capital
accumulated within its territory. Third, a nation’s tax code must be
transparent to the tax authorities of other nations when the nation
acts as a conduit for portfolio investment. These primary norms of
international tax law would be subject to permissible anti-abuse
regimes and the secondary norms mentioned below.
The three primary norms are based on the value to global
economic development of capital formation, a variety of approaches
to the design of national economic environments, including the size of
a nation’s public sector, and of sovereign competition. It is only
through the comparison of different economic environments that we
may determine the effect of different institutional arrangements on
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economic performance. Global economic development must take into
account adaptive efficiency as well as allocative efficiency. As a
species of allocative efficiency, the traditional tax policy of capital
export neutrality is subordinate to the economic design of institutions
that promote the well-being of the world’s people.
Furthermore, to gain the full benefit of decentralized decisionmaking among the world’s nations, we must preserve incentives for
national decision-makers to be attentive to the design of a nation’s
economic environment and to capital formation within that
environment. Chief among those incentives is the tax revenue
generated by an economic environment and by capital formation.
These limitations suggest that a national tax code consist of an
exemption system for the business income of residents, source-based
taxation of nonresidents of their business income from permanent
establishments, a worldwide system for portfolio income derived from
capital accumulated within the nation’s economic environment, a
conditional absence of taxation of nonresidents’ portfolio income
derived from capital accumulated elsewhere, an anti-abuse regime
similar to today’s anti-deferral regimes, and a conditional exchange of
tax information with other nations. Neither a foreign tax credit nor a
preferential tax regime should be included in a national income tax
code. A nation would be free to set its tax rate at whatever level it
determines best for economic development, subject to the constraints
of international capital markets and sovereign competition.
The Article then addressed collective action problems among
sovereign decision-makers. Anti-abuse regimes are one method of
coordinating collective action. Those regimes deter tax evasion by
enterprises attempting to make only phantom choices among national
economic environments for their business operations or place of
residence. Treaties are a second method of coordinating collective
action. Tax treaties facilitate the movement of nations toward the
primary norms of international taxation.
The primary norms of international taxation are the international
equivalent of social norms. To the extent these norms are not selfenforcing, we must devise secondary social norms for their
enforcement. Those secondary norms would be embodied in national
tax codes, bilateral tax treaties, or a multinational tax treaty.
The Article proposes three secondary norms of international
taxation. First, a nation may tax currently a resident’s business
income derived under another nation’s preferential tax regime or, as
an alternative, may impose measured import duties on products and
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services produced under a preferential tax regime. Second, a nation
may impose a conditional and substantial withholding tax on portfolio
income paid to residents of a particular nation. Third, a nation may
suspend its exchange of tax information with a particular nation. A
nation would be able to pursue the second and third norms either in
response to another nation’s residence-based taxation of business
income or in response to another nation’s taxation of nonresidents’
portfolio income.
A multilateral tax treaty is required to define the primary and
secondary norms, to resolve disputes about possible violations of the
norms, and to authorize the imposition of secondary norms as
measured retaliation for violations of primary norms. Such a treaty
would bear similarities to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade and could be incorporated into the body of agreements
administered by the World Trade Organization.

